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INTRODUCTION
The importance of the relationship between Article IV of the Con-
stitution' and Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment2 has been
evident since the Amendment's ratification. During the congres-
sional debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, the Amendment's
framers often pointed to the terms "privileges" and "immunities"
used in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution as precursors to the
identical terms used in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Indeed, modem commentators examining the history of the
Amendment frequently acknowledge that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV, Section 2 served as a precursor of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment.4  The language of the two clauses is similar, but more
1. "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONST., art. iv, § 2, cl. 1.
2. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Ohio Congressman John Armor Bingham, the principal draftsman of Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment, in an 1871 Report by the House Committee on the Judiciary dis-
cussing whether women's suffrage could be enacted under the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
stated that the Clause "does not, in the opinion of the committee, refer to the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities em-
braced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4, section 2." H.R. REP. No. 41-22, at 1
(1871), reprinted in THE RECONSTRUCTIONAMENDMENTS' DEBATES 466 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967);
see also MIcHAEL KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS 168 (1986) (discussing H.P. REP. NO. 41-22). Similarly, Vermont Senator
Luke Poland argued in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause "secures nothing beyond what was intended by the original provision in the
Constitution, that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States.'" CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866).
4. See, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, The Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Slaughter-House Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 627, 630 (1994) (discussing
the controversy over the proper interpretation of Article IV); Lambert Gingras, Congressional
Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers' Understanding: The Case of the Fourteenth Amendmen 40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 41, 47 (1996) (arguing that "Bingham and other Republicans... read the comity
clause as creating or recognizing a national set of rights, protected from state interference and
similar from one state to another"); Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal Protection of the Laws-A
HistoricalInquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 499, 539 (1985) (stating that Representative Bingham's
intent in drafting Section One was to ensure enforcement of guarantees that were already in-
herent in the Constitution, "particularly those inherent in the comity clause"); Michael W.
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 999-1000 (1995)
(noting that the Slaughter-House decision cannot be correct because it means that Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment would protect a set of rights that was different from that pro-
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significantly, certain shared concepts underlie the two.
Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, a well-
developed body of case law regarding the Constitution's Privileges
and Immunities Clause had been established! Members of Congress
were able to utilize this jurisprudence to explicate the meaning of the
terms "privileges" and "immunities" as used in Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Representative Bingham, the principal
draftsman of Section One, and other Republicans believed that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was de-
signed to guarantee United States citizens certain privileges and im-
munities that were inherent in the concept of American citizenship.6
Several Republicans, however, believed that the Constitution pro-
vided no mechanism for congressional enforcement of the Clause.7
tected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2).
5. A number of cases had been decided under the Clause, including Ducat v. Chicago, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1871), aftg48 Il. 172 (1868); Downham v. Alexandria Counci 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 173 (1869); Corfield v. Carye/l 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230);People v.
Coleman, 4 Cal. 46 (1854); Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339 (1859); People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554
(1852); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68 (1868);Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Lit.)
326 (1822); Ward v. State; 31 Md. 279 (1869); Haney v. Marshall 9 Md. 194 (1856); Campbell v.
Morris, 3 H. & McH. 554 (Md. 1797); Abbott v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 92 (1827); Lemmon v.
Pple, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860); People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1855);FireDep't v. Noble, 3
E.D. Smith 441 (N.Y.C.P. 1854); State v. Medbuiy, 3 R. 138 (1855); Slaughter v. Commonwealth,
55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 767 (1856);FireDep't v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 142 (1862). See RAOUL BERGER,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) [hereinafter BERGER,
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT] (discussing some of the more prominent cases).
6. Representative Bingham noted that the Amendment granted Congress the power to
enforce "in behalf of every citizen ... the rights which were guaranteed to him from the begin-
ning, but which guarantee has unhappily been disregarded by more than one State of this Un-
ion, defiantly disregarded, simply because of a want of power in Congress to enforce that guar-
antee." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 429 (1866). Similarly, Congressman Frederick
Woodbridge, a Vermont Radical, stated that the proposed Amendment would
give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which necessarily pertain to
citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactments when necessary to
give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever State he may be, those privileges and
immunities which are guarantied to him under the Constitution of the United States.
Id. at 1088. Michael Kent Curtis has argued that Representative Bingham and other members
of Congress believed that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 pro-
tected certain rights of national citizenship, including the Bill of Rights. While recognizing
that '[t]his reading may have been incorrect," Curtis notes that "Bingham and others who
framed the Fourteenth Amendment relied on a reading of the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IV, section 2 by which it protected a body of national privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States, including those in the Bill of Rights." CURTIS, supra note 3,
at 114. Raoul Berger has argued, however, that the majority did not share Representative
Bingham's "unorthodox" view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See BERGER, FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 5, at 96-97.
7. Prominent members of Congress, such asJames Wilson of Iowa, floor manager of the
Civil Rights Bill and Chairman of the HouseJudiciary Committee, may have disagreed with the
notion that Congress did not have enforcement power under Article IV. Unlike Representative
Bingham, Wilson indicated that Congress had the implied authority to enforce the Privileges
and Immunities Clause against the states. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117-19
(1866).
In discussing the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Congressman Thaddeus Stevens
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This lack of congressional enforcement power led to problems when
states refused to afford each other comity under Article IV.8 In order
to remedy these deficiencies and to clarify what many Republicans
thought was already contained in the Constitution, Congress drafted
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.9 The people subse-
quently ratified the Amendment to protect the rights of the newly-
freed black populace and to enshrine a guarantee of the fundamen-
tal rights of citizenship in the constitutional text.'0
In addition to discussions during debate over the proposed
amendment, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 was also mentioned in the context of the debate over the Civil
Rights Bill of 1866," which was designed to prevent inequalities with
stated:
I can hardly believe that any person can be found who will not admit that every one of
these provisions is just. They are all asserted, in some form or other, in our
DECLARATION or organic law. But the Constitution limits only the action of Con-
gress, and is not a limitation on the States. This amendment supplies that defect, and
allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which
operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 2459 (1866). Some Republicans, however, thought that
there was a congressional power to enforce the guaranteed privileges and immunities of citi-
zens under either the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Guarantee Clause. For example,
Congressman William D. Kelley, a Republican from Pennsylvania, stated, "I find in [the Consti-
tution] now, powers by which the General Government may defend the rights, liberties, privi-
leges, and immunities of the humblest citizen wherever he may be upon our country's soil."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1062-63 (1866). Similarly, Congressman William Higby, a
Radical Republican from California, stated that the proposed Amendment would "only have
the effect to give vitality and life to portions of the Constitution that probably were intended
from the beginning to have life and vitality, but which have received such a construction that
they have been entirely ignored and have become as dead matter in that instrument." Id. at
1054; see also Bushnell v. Langston, 9 Ohio St. 77, 123-24 (1859) (discussing the lack of congres-
sional enforcement power under the Clause).
8. There was not always compliance with the Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and
Immunities Clauses of Article IV, Section 2 on the part of the states prior to ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. As Paul Finkelman has noted,
[s]tates could and did deny privileges and immunities to citizens of other states. Full
faith and credit were not always given to out-of-state judicial decrees. Such denials of
comity, by both the North and the South, were partially responsible for the dissolution
of the Union. The memory of such problems motivated the adoption of certain sec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 8 (1980).
9. U.S. CONsT. Amend. XIV, § 1.
10. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866) (statement of Rep. Woodbridge)
(questioning whether it was enough to merely free slaves and noting that the Fourteenth
Amendment "is not onlyjustifiable, but necessary").
11. Section One of the Civil Rights Bill which was passed over the veto of President An-
drewJohnson reads as follows:
[A]II persons born in the United States ... are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens of every race and color, without regard to any previ-
ous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude ... shall have the same right to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit
of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
354
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respect to certain fundamental lights of citizens occasioned by the
Southern Black Codes."
For example, James Wilson, a Republican from Iowa, stated that
"[i]f the States would all practice the constitutional declaration [of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause] and enforce it,... we might
very well refrain from the enactment of this bill into a law."' 3 There-
fore, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was identified as address-
ing the same natural or common-law rights that were guaranteed un-
der the Civil Rights Bill.
If free blacks were citizens of the United States, or could be given
this status through congressional legislation, and if the national gov-
ernment had the power to address state government violations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 through leg-
islation, then there would be no question of the constitutionality of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.4 Representative Bingham, however,
called the constitutionality of the Act into question,' 5 prompting
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwith-
standing.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1366 (1866). As the above excerpt demonstrates, many of
the rights enumerated in the Bill were fundamental common-law rights. This fact is consistent
with an interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing a closed set of common-
law rights to citizens of the United States. See Douglas G. Smith, Citizenship and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 681, 685 n.10 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Citizenship] (noting
that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed privileges and immunities essential to citizenship,
analogous to the "common rights" of English citizens).
12. Se HOmAmE E. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT 81 (1908)
(concluding that "nearly all [Members of Congress] said that [the Fourteenth Amendment]
was but an incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill"); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 44 (1949)
(noting that "[o]ver and over in the debate [about the Amendment], the correspondence be-
tween Section One of the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is noted. The provisions of one
are treated as though they were essentially identical with those of the other"). For a discussion
of the Southern Black Codes, to which the Civil Rights Act was addressed, see THEODORE B.
WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH (1965).
13. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lstSess. 1117-18 (1866).
14. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27. The Civil Rights Bill declared that'all persons
born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed,"
were "citizens of the United States." Id. § 1. The Civil Rights Act was widely recognized as a
precursor of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. George Latham of West Virginia
stated that the "'civil rights bill' which is now law.., covers exactly the same ground as the
amendment," CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2833 (1866). Martin Thayer, a Republican
from Pennsylvania, stated that the Amendment was "but incorporating in the Constitution the
principle of the civil rights bill which has lately become law." Id. at 2465; see also StevenJ. Hey-
man, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J.
507, 566 (1991) (stating that "constitutionalizing the Civil Rights Act was a major purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment").
15. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-92 (1866). Some state appellate courts
also declared the Civil Rights Act unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658
(1869); People v. Rash, 1 Del. (HousL) 271 (1867); Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5
(1867).
THE AMEiCAN UNIVERSriY LAw REviEw [Vol. 47:351
Congress to draft the Fourteenth Amendment to ensure its constitu-
tionality. Thus, once the meaning of the phrase, "Privileges and Im-
munities of Citizens," as used in Article IV, Section 2 has been de-
termined, one can explain the specific enumeration of rights to be
protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1866.16
Even after the Amendment had been ratified, the Supreme Court
dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases cited the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause as employing the terms "privileges" and "immunities" in
exactly the same manner as they were used in Section One. In the
Slaughter-House Cases,17 the majority narrowly construed the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Amendment, holding that the privileges
and immunities referenced were only certain limited rights of na-
tional citizenship. 8 Several justices, however, wrote lengthy dissent-
ing opinions, arguing that the protections afforded under the Clause
were intended to be much broader.' 9 For example, according to jus-
tice Field, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2 provided that "[n]o discrimination can be made by one State
against the citizens of other States in their enjoyment, nor can any
greater imposition be levied than such as is laid upon its own citi-
zens."2  Similarly, Justice Field defined the relationship between the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 and the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment as follows:
What [the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2] did for the protection of the citizens of one State against hostile
and discriminating legislation of other States, the 14th Amendment
16. ProfessorJohn Harrison has noted that "[alny theory of the Fourteenth Amendment
must... explain how it validates the Civil Rights Act." John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privi-
leges orImmunities Clause, 101 YALE LJ. 1385, 1390 (1992).
17. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
18. A number of commentators have noted the decision's effect. See, e.g., ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PoLrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 37, 166 (1990)
(arguing that the Court's decision rendered the Clause "a dead letter"); 2 Louis B. BOUDIN,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 106, 107, 204 (1968) (noting that the Court emasculated the
Clause); Aynes, supra note 4, at 627-28; Charles Fairman, What Makes a Great Justice?: Mr.Justice
Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. REV. 49, 78 (1950) (suggesting that the
Court's decision "virtually scratched" the Clause from the Constitution); Sanford Levinson,
Some Reflections on the Rehabilitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment; 12 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 71, 73 (1989) (arguing that the Court"ruthlessly eviscerated
the Clause of practically all operative meaning"); Patricia Allan Lucie, White Rights as a Modlfor
Black: Or-Who's Afraid of the Privileges or Immunities Clause?, 38 SYRACUSE L. REV. 859, 859-60
(1987) (noting that the Clause became extinct when the Slaughter-House decision was handed
down); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change 32
AM.J.JuRIs. 1, 2 (1987) (concluding that Court "gutted the privileges or immunities clause").
19. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 83-111 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111-24 (Bradley,
J., dissenting); id. at 124-30 (Swayne,J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 98 (Field,J., dissenting).
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does for the protection of every citizen of the United States against
hostile and discriminating legislation, against him in favor of others
whether they reside in the same or in different states. If under the
4th Article of the Constitution, equality of privileges and immuni-
ties is secured between citizens of different states, under the 14th
Amendment the same equality is secured between citizens of the
United States.
2'
Thus, in congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act, debates
over the Fourteenth Amendment, and in the Slaughter-House Cases,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 figured
prominently. An understanding of the principles underlying the
Clause is thus important in determining the meaning of Section One
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Scholars have long debated the meaning of the terms "privileges"
and "immunities" as used in Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and Article IV, Section 2 .2 This Article continues this tradition
by examining the provisions found in Article IV and their relevance
in interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause of Section One.2
In particular, the theoretical underpinnings of these provisions are
discussed in detail in order to gain some understanding of the direc-
tives embodied in Section One.
During the nineteenth century, the prevalent view was that the
"privileges" and "immunities" of citizens were those powers or capaci-
ties inherent in the concept of citizenship, which flowed from princi-
ples of natural law, the positive common law, and the state constitu-
tions.24  These natural or common-law privileges were perhaps
21. Id. at 100-01.
22. See generally RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY" THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977) [hereinafter BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY]; FLACK, su-
pra note 12; Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Seregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1955); Fairman, supra note 12.
23. This Article does not address the role of the Fugitive Slave Clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV,
§ 2, in the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a discussion of the role the Fugitive
Slave Clause played in the formation of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Douglas G. Smith, The
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: Precursor of Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 858-72 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Privieges]; see also
RobertJ. Kaczorowski, The Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866: A Legislative His-
tory ofRunyon v. McCrary, 98YALE Lj. 565,565 (1989) (noting that"the fugitive slave clause, as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, provided the framers of the Civil Rights Act
with a theory of constitutional delegation of plenary congressional authority to secure funda-
mental rights which they invoked in their efforts to enforce civil rights").
24. Natural rights theory had been influential in American legal thought since the time of
the Revolution. See generally ERWIN S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1955); CHARLES G. HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS
(1965); CHARLES MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1933); Tho-
mas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionaty
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978). Several commentators have noted the significant influ-
ence of natural law theories on the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., CURTIS,
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equivalent to those rights intended to be protected through a guar-
antee of a "Republican" form of government under the Guarantee
Clause of Article IV, Section 4 .25 This proposition, however, is not
self-evident. It is not clear that the Guarantee Clause was thought to
protect substantive rights. It may merely have been a protection
from invasion or internal unrest. Thus, the questions that arise con-
cern the nature of the rights that were guaranteed under Article IV,
and which clauses in that Article provided those guarantees.
In addition to questions concerning the nature of the rights guar-
anteed under the provisions, questions concerning the nature of the
protection afforded those rights also arise. The protection may have
been substantive or merely "anti-discrimination" (equality-based)
protection. The drafters of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV either intended to guarantee a core set of uniform, fun-
damental rights throughout the states, or merely equal civil rights.
Substantive protection may have flowed from either the Privileges
and Immunities Clause itself or from the guarantee of a "Republican"
form of government. Thus, it is important to understand the nine-
teenth century interpretation of Article IV and the nature of the pro-
tection afforded thereunder.
Part I of this Article examines the theoretical foundations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Because
principles of natural law and the law of nations served as a back-
ground for the framing of the Clause, a detailed analysis of these
principles is useful in determining the purpose and scope of the
Clause. Part II discusses the potential role of the Guarantee Clause
of Article IV, Section 4 as working in conjunction with the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 to provide substantive
protection for the privileges and immunities of citizens. The guaran-
tee of a "Republican" form of government may have embodied pro-
supra note 3; DANIELA. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISrORYOFTHEAMERICAN CONSTITUTION
(1990); HOwARDJ. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONSTrUTMON (1968); David S. Bogen, The Transfor-
mation of the Fourteenth Amendment: Reflections From Admission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44
MD. L. REV. 939, 942 (1985); Daniel A. Farber &John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONsT. COMM. 235 (1984); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Consti-
tutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 863, 891 (1986); Earl
Maltz, Reconstruction Without Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theory in the Era of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 24 HOUs. L. REv. 221, 224 (1987) [hereinafter Maltz, Reconstruction] (stating that
"Republicans were committed to the concept of natural rights, which they saw as embodied in
the statement of the Declaration of Independence that all men were entitled to 'life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness'"); Trisha Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REv. 347, 350 (1995) (concluding that
"the [Privileges and Immunities) Clause must be placed against the backdrop of the classical
natural law tradition embraced by the 39th Congress").
25. See infra Part II (discussing the role of the Guarantee Clause in protecting substantive
rights).
1997] NATURAL LAW, ARTICLE IV, AND SECTION ONE
tection for certain common-law rights uniformly throughout the
United States. Finally, Part III applies the conclusions concerning
the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Guarantee Clause of
Article IV reached in previous sections in interpreting Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The analysis indicates that the provisions of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment are not indeterminate. Rather, they flow
from a long and rich legal tradition that provides the context for
their interpretation. When viewed in this light, it becomes clear that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Amendment was designed
to guarantee a core set of rights thought to be inherent in citizen-
ship. Moreover, the best interpretation of the Amendment appears
to be that it was intended to afford not only "anti-discrimination," but
also substantive protection for the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens. This substantive guarantee, however, did not mean that the
courts were free to invade the province of the state legislatures by
dictating the mode or manner in which these privileges could be exer-
cised. Rather, the Amendment left the states wide latitude to regu-
late these privileges and immunities with no fear of federal intrusion.
I. THE INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 did
not arise from a blank slate, but rather from a well-developed body of
law concerning the natural relations of sovereign states. The Clause
was viewed not only as an "individual rights" provision, but also as a
"federalism" provision, maintaining the integrity of the federal sys-
26tem as well as the equality of the states as political entities. The
Clause, however, went beyond principles of comity, making the citi-
zens of the several states one people and creating positive, conven-
tional obligations in the place of "unwritten" principles of reason that
served as legal default rules.
26. See David S. Bogen, The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 794, 844 (1987) (noting that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2
was designed to be as much a federalism provision, governing relations among the states, as it
was to be an individual rights provision, guaranteeing that the citizens of the individual states
would be recognized as citizens within foreign jurisdictions); John M. Gonzales, The Interstate
Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental Rights or Federalism?, 15 CAP. U. L. REV. 493, 499-500
(1986) (stating that Article IV, Section 2 was intended to prohibit state-imposed obstacles to
effective federalism).
27. For example, in Lemmon v. People 20 N.Y. 562 (1860), the NewYork Court of Appeals
upheld the freedom of slaves brought through New York in transit. Judge Thomas W. Clerke
in his dissent argued that New York was bound to recognize slave property under the Privileges
and Immunities Clause. Clerke stated:
359
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One of the themes underlying the antebellum discussion of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was the no-
tion that the "privileges" and "immunities" of citizens-the inalien-
able rights of man and those powers or capacities of citizens flowing
from the social compact-correspond to certain natural law rights
existing anterior to the establishment of government.' A second
theme underlying the discussion concerning the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause was the desire to place citizens of the United States
under the same body of fundamental civil law2
The unification of these two seemingly divergent rationales is
found in the relationship between natural law and the jus gentium, or
law of nations.ss The principles of natural law were thought to be
founded in reason." They formed a set of axioms concerning human
nature to which all rational individuals would assent, and from which
propositions could be deduced through the exercise of reason.
Therefore, one would expect that in societies where rational indi-
viduals formulated the laws, the laws would express these principles.s3
For example, John Locke's influential natural law theory recognized
that the principles of natural law tend to be adopted as conventional
laws. Locke reasoned that:
The law of nature is the law of convenience too: it is no wonder,
that those men of parts, and studious of virtues... should, by
meditation, light on the right, even from the observable conven-
ience and beauty of it; without making out its obligation from the
[T]he relations of the different States of this Union towards each other are of a much
closer and more positive nature than those between foreign nations.... They are one
nation; war between them is legally impossible; and this comity, impliedly recognized
by the law of nations, ripens, in the compact cementing these States into an express
conventional obligation, which is not to be enforced by an appeal to arms but to be
recognized and enforced by thejudicial tribunals.
Id. at 642.
28. See Smith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 723 (applying social compact theories popular
in the nineteenth century to the interpretation of Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); see also infra Part I.B (discussing the relationship between the common law and the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2).
29. SeeSmith, Citizenship, supranote 11, at 747 (noting that "[t]he purpose of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to ensure that all citizens were af-
forded the same fundamental civil capacities inherent in the concept of citizenship in the
United States, analogous to those that had existed from the time of the Roman law, as well as
all of the natural rights of persons found in the English common law").
30. See infra Part IA (discussing the relationship between natural law and the law of na-
tions).
31. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
33. John Norton Pomeroy argued in 1864 that as nations become more developed, the
laws reflect more and more the "innate principles of natural justice common to all times and
peoples which the Romans called jus gentium" JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
MUNICIPAL LAW § 8 (1864).
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true principles of the law of nature, and foundations of morality.3
As a result, one would expect that certain principles of government
would be adopted by all civilized nations because these principles
were founded in reason. As Emmerich Vattel, a seventeenth-century
natural law theorist stated, "[h]appiness is the point where centre all
those duties which individuals and nations owe to themselves; and
this is the great end of the law of nature."" Thus, the natural law was
conceived of as a set of ideal principles which might not find com-
plete expression in positive laws.
Thomas Hobbes, another influential natural law philosopher, also
discussed the relation between the natural law and positive civil law
in his treatise on goverment entitled, Leviathan. Hobbes seemed to
go even further than Locke or Vattel, indicating that natural "laws"
were not properly termed "law" until they were embodied in the posi-
tive civil law:
The Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and are
of equall extent. For the Lawes of Nature... are not properly
Lawes, but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience.
When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actually
Lawes, and not before; as being then the commands of the Corn-
-16mon-wealth; and therefore also Civil Lawes.
Hobbes recognized these natural law principles not as "laws," but
rather as propositions founded upon reason. He reserved the term
"laws" for the positive expression of these propositions by the legisla-
ture.
Indeed, Hobbes was not alone in viewing the natural law in this
manner. Locke also noted this connection between the civil law and
the law of nature: "[T] he municipal laws of countries... are only so
far right as they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are
regulated and interpreted.""7 Although there may be no coercive
force available to enforce the principles of natural law in a state of
nature, such coercive power does exist in society. This is the funda-
mental distinction between natural law and positive civil law. Neither
of these bodies of law may be coextensive in any given society. There
will be some degree of overlap, however, as the lawmakers utilize
34. JAMES TULLY, A DIScOURsE ON PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIs ADVERSARIES 47
(Cambridge University Press 1980) (quotingJOHN LOCKE, REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY,
ch. VII, at 142 (1823) (alteration in original)).
35. EMMERICH VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAw 47
(Charles D. Fenwick trans., T. &J.W.Johnson & Co. 1863) (1758) [hereinafterVATrEL, LAW OF
NATIONS].
36. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 314 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
37. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 13 (Prometheus Books
1986) (1690).
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their powers of reason to conform the positive law to the natural law,
even though they may not be consciously aware of this result.
Roman law, the source of many of the concepts elaborated upon
by natural law philosophers, also recognized a distinction between
natural and positive law. s The Roman conception of natural law,
however, was not nearly as well developed as it was during the period
spanning the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.39 The Roman
law made a distinction between three separate types of private law:
natural law (jus naturale), the law of nations (jus gentium), and the
civil law (jus civile).4' For example, in Justinian's Institutes, three cate-
gories of private law are described: laws derived from natural con-
cepts, laws governing individual states, and laws typically followed by
nations. Private law regulated and declared the private rights of
persons under the Roman Code.42 The jus civile applied only to those
who possessed the status of citizen, affording such individuals certain
privileges under the law.43 The jus gentium represented the body of
law that applied to noncitizens living within the Roman Empire and
contained principles of law common to all nations."4 The jus naturale
represented an ideal form of law, or principles of reason, upon which
all other law was based.4
This distinction between the civil law and the law of nations was
familiar to courts in the United States even before the Constitution
was framed. A number of courts referred to the distinction in decid-
46ing cases involving issues concerning interstate relations as well as
38. SeeJUSTINIAN'S INSrTIVTES 1.2 (observing that natural law is common to all people,
whereas positive law is particular to a given state).
39. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 2 (Melville M. Bigelow ed.,
8th ed. London, Little, Brown & Co. 1883) [hereinafter STORY, CONFLICT OFLAWS]. According
to Justice Story, the concept of the law of nations was not as well developed under the ancient
Roman legal system:
It is certain that the nations of antiquity did not recognize the existence of any general
or universal rights and obligations, such as among the moderns constitute what is now
emphatically called the Law of Nations. Even among the Romans, whose jurispru-
dence has come down to us in a far more perfect and comprehensive shape than that
of any other nation, there cannot be traced out any distinct system of principles appli-
cable to international cases of mixed rights.
Id
40. See WILLIAM L. BURDICK, THE PRINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW 182 (1983) (listing natural
law, civil law, and the law of nations as components of Roman law); Smith, Citizenship, supra
note 11, at 735-36 (elaborating upon the distinctions made under the Roman law).
41. SeeJUSTINiAN'S INSTITUTES 1.1.
42. See BURDICK, supra note 40, at 182 (differentiating between private and public rights).
43. See id. at 199.
44. See id. at 200 (describing application of thejus gentium to govern persons who were not
Roman citizens).
45. See id. at 182.
46. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 467-79 (1856) (discussing civil
law and the law of nations under the Roman Empire); Miller v. McQuerry, 17 F. Cas. 335, 339
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international relations.47 These cases applied principles of Roman
(C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583) (discussing notions of natural law and civil law); Camp v.
Lockwood, 1 U.S. (1 DaII.) 393, 396-97 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1788) (analogizing general principles ap-
plicable to foreign countries based on the law of nations to the sovereignty of states within the
United States); Miller v. Hall, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 229, 232 (Pa. 1788) (discussing the law of na-
tions).
The court in Miller v. Hall appealed to the law of nations as well as to the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause in rendering its decision. See Miller, 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) at 232. The court sided
with the defendant, recognizing that "foreign laws" (i.e., a Maryland statute) could have effect
outside of the jurisdiction of their origin. See id. The sovereign states were foreign nations with
respect to each other, but the laws of one could become binding in the others through applica-
tion of the principles of the law of nations and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. The Court reasoned:
[H]aving considered the principles of the law of nations, and the reciprocal obliga-
tion of the states under the articles of confederation, we are of opinion, that the act of
assembly by which the Defendant has been discharged, must be considered as a gen-
eral bankrupt law, made for general purposes.... It is true, that laws of a particular
country, have in themselves no extra-territorial force, no coercive operation; but by
the consent of nations, they acquire an influence and obligation, and, in many in-
stances, become conclusive throughout the world.
Id. The court appealed not only to the natural law and the positive law of the Articles of Con-
federation, but also to the law of nations in reaching its decision in favor of the defendant:
From the nature of the act, then, it appears to be founded upon equitable grounds,
for general and just purposes; it ought, therefore, to be regarded in all other coun-
tries, and should enjoy that weight, in our decisions, which it naturally derives from
general convenience, expediency, justice and humanity. For, mutual convenience,
policy, the consent of nations, and the general principles ofjustice, form a code which
pervades all nations, and must be everywhere acknowledged and pursued.
Id. at 232-33. The Court thus emphasized that laws founded upon natural law and equitable
principles deserved recognition as binding upon all nations, according to the law of nations.
Furthermore, the Court indicated that these principles were binding as positive obligations,
particularly since the states had consented to reciprocal obligations under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation. See id. (discussing the"code" that all states
should acknowledge).
47. The law of nations and the influence of the natural law in shaping that body of law was
recognized in United States v. LaJeuneEugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551),
a case involving the legality of the slave trade. The court considered the issue of whether the
slave trade was "contrary to the law of nations." Id. at 834. The United States government ar-
gned that the slave trade was not only contrary to the law of nature, but also to the positive laws
of the various "civilized nations of the globe." Id. Thus, the government based its action in
part on the understanding that the principles of natural law and the positive law of various
countries form the law of nations, orjus gentium. See id. Both the inductive and deductive ap-
proaches to determining the principles of the law of nations were considered in arguments
before the court. See id. at 834-36.
The court also discussed the law of nations in its opinion. See id. at 845. According to the
court, in the international community, where no supreme power existed over sovereign na-
tions, interference with the internal affairs of a state was forbidden. The court, therefore, ac-
knowledged the sovereign power of each state to regulate the rights of those within its jurisdic-
tion:
[E]ach nation may regulate every interior interest without giving offence, and without
accountability to any other nation. The form of government, and mode of admini-
stration; religion and mode of worship; what shall be deemed to be property, and
what shall not be; the mode of acquisition, possession, and alienation; what acts shall
be deemed crimes, and what forfeitures shall ensue, are all subjects which each nation
reserves to itself.
Id. at 835. The court looked to the positive law of various nations in determining that property
in human beings was consistent with the law of nations. According to the court,"' [i]t is impos-
sible to say, that the slave trade is contrary to what may be called the common law of nations.'"
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law and principles of the law of nations developed by continental ju-
rists such as Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel,'8 despite the fact that
America had inherited a common-law system from England. The
American states, much like states in the international arena, were
viewed (to a certain extent) as existing in a hypothetical state of na-
ture, 9 from which the union among them emerged.ss The impor-
Id. at 839 (quoting Madrazo v. Willes, 3 Barn. & Aid. 353, 358, 5 Eng. Rep. 208, 211 (1820)).
Therefore, even though the court recognized that slavery might be contrary to natural law, it
decided the case based on positive law, reasoning that positive expression of the will of nations
could override principles of natural law. See id.
48. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 477 (referring to legal principles laid down by Vattel);
Camp, 1 U.S. at 396-98 (citing the theories of Vattel).
49. In his concurrence in Dred Scott,Justice Daniel engaged in an extensive discussion of
the views of Emmerich de Vattel, who presented a model of states as existing in a state of na-
ture. Justice Daniel asserted that no state within the United States had the right to confer the
privileges and immunities of citizenship upon individuals in other states. See id. at 483-85
(Daniel,J., concurring). Indeed, this was a consequence of the natural equality of states:
"The natural society of nations," says this writer [Vattel], "cannot subsist unless the
natural tights of each be respected." ... Again, in section 18th, of the same chapter,
"nations composed of men, and considered as so many free persons living together in
a state of nature, are naturally equal, and inherit from nature the same obligations
and rights. Power or weakness does not produce any difference. A small republic is
no less a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom."
Id. at 483-84 (citing Kent's Commentaries, Grotius, Heineccius, Vattel, and Rutherforth as
authorities on the law of nations).
50. In Camp v. Lockwood, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County cited Vattel's
treatise on the law of nations extensively in deciding whether a Connecticut act could have ex-
traterritorial effect. See Camp, 1 U.S. at 395. The Connecticut law declared that all property of
any person who had joined the enemies of the United States or had assisted them during the
Revolutionary War should be confiscated. See id. at 393. The plaintiff was a resident of Penn-
sylvania who formerly had resided in Connecticut. While in Connecticut, he had joined the
British Army, and the state subsequently confiscated all of his property and refused to enforce
payment of a debt that another Connecticut resident owed to him. The plaintiff brought suit
in Pennsylvania to collect the debt. Citing Vattel, Burlamaqui, and Pufendorf, plaintiffs coun-
sel (Rawle) suggested that the states should be viewed as existing in a state of nature:
[N]ations, with respect to each other, must be considered as individuals in a state of
nature.... In a state of society, private property yields to the general good; but this is
not the case in a state of nature; and therefore, it may be taken as an axiom, that
where the act of a particular nation vests in itself the property of an individual,
whether a subject or not, the right, thus acquired, extends no further than the juris-
diction of that nation, and the act upon which it is founded can have no extra-
territorial force.
Id. at 395 (citations omitted). Therefore, under the plaintiffs reasoning, the law of Connecti-
cut would not be binding in Pennsylvania, and the debt could be collected. The defendant
argued, however, that Pennsylvania should respect the Connecticut act out of principles found
in the "law of nations" and sanctioned under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Arti-
des of Confederation. See id. at 398. Ingersol, the defendant's counsel, argued that there was
not only a voluntary law of nations but also a necessary one. According to the reporter,
He [Ingersol] observed, that he did not controvert the general doctrine advanced by
the opposite counsel, that the law of nations is the law of nature, applied to nations,
and that one sovereign power cannot be bound by another, but he distinguished be-
tween the necessary, and the voluntary law of nations, which arises ex comitate; and in-
sisted, that the laws of a nation actually enforced, are every where obligatory, unless
they interfere with the independency of another legislature; for common convenience
renders it necessary to give a certain degree of force to the statutes of foreign nations;
If nations unconnected by any tie, thus indirectly give effect to the laws of each
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tance of the principles developed by legal scholars considering the
relations among states in the international arena were acknowledged
for their relevance in dealing with relations among the states in the
American federal system.5 '
Part L.A of this Article explores the relationship among the law of
nature, the law of nations, and the civil law. It further discusses the
manner in which the principles of the law of nations served as the le-
gal background for adoption of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV, Section 2. Part I.B then addresses the relationship be-
tween the common law and the jus gentium, or law of nations. This
Part concludes that American "common law" served as a source of
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed
under Article IV, Section 2. It is likely that these principles were
thought to be constitutionally mandated through a substantive guar-
antee under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 or through their expression in state constitutions and other
organic law.52 At a minimum, these principles served as an assumed
other, the principle upon which it is done, must with greater strength prevail in the
case of a political union like that of the American states.... Thus, it is declared by the
articles of confederation, that a citizen of one state, is a citizen of every state; and the
congress are not, as Mr. Adams has termed them, an assemblage of ambassadors; but a
sovereign power.
Id. (citations omitted). The defendant thus argued that the relationship between the states
under the Articles of Confederation was stronger than that between foreign sovereigns. The
states not only shared the law of nations, but also, in a sense, shared the civil law because citi-
zens of one state were deemed to be citizens of all of the other states under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation. Furthermore, the states in the Union had
consented to be bound by the Constitution, and there existed a superior sovereign power em-
bodied in the federal government, under which this law of nations could become binding. See
id. at 399 ("The United States though individually sovereign and independent, must admit, not
only the voluntary law of nations, but a peculiar law resulting from their relative situation.").
This "peculiar law" arose from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confed-
eration and the respect that the states owed to the laws of other states in order to preserve the
private rights of person and property, privileges and immunities, of citizens in the several states.
See generally STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 39, at 9-10 (considering private rights of citi-
zens of each state in relation to the others).
51. For example, Justice Story authored a treatise on the conflict of laws, acknowledging
the importance of this area of law to the relations of the states within the American federal sys-
tem:
Thejurisprudence... arising from the conflict of the laws of different nations in their
actual application to modern commerce and intercourse, is a most interesting and
important branch of public law. To no part of the world is it of more interest and im-
portance than to the United States, since the union of a national government with al-
ready that of twenty-six distinct States, and in some respects independent states, neces-
sarily creates very complicated private relations and rights between the citizens of
those states, which call for the constant administration of extra-municipal principles.
STORY, CONFLICT OF LAws, supra note 39, at 9-10.
52. In Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. (13 Gratt.) 767 (1856), the court considered
whether corporations were entitled to the guarantee of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, Section 2. The court explicitly stated that "[i]n Virginia they [the privileges and
immunities of citizens] may be regarded as set forth in our bill of rights and constitution." Id.
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background of fundamental rights under the Clause.-s
A. The Law of Nature, the Law of Nations, and the Civil Law
In general, the phrase "law of nations" has been used to denote
those principles of law common among the bodies of positive law
found in various civilized nations.4 Although some writers during
the nineteenth century used the phrase "law of nations" synony-
mously with "jus gentium," the practice was not universally followed.
The phrase "law of nations" was also commonly used to denote inter-
national law or the law governing relations among states.M
As Charles G. Fenwick noted in an introduction to Vattel's widely-
cited work on the law of nations, "[t]he celebrated Grotius under-
stands by the 'Law of Nations' a law established by the common con-
sent of Nations, and he thus distinguishes it from the natural law."57
Similarly, O.W. Holmes, Jr., in editor's notes accompanying Chancel-
lor Kent's Commentaries on American Law, also acknowledged the nine-
teenth-century confusion between the jus gentium and international
law. Holmes concluded that "[t]hejus naturale, or Law of Nature, is
simply the jus gentium, ... seen in the light of a peculiar theory....
The confusion between jus gentium, or law common to all nations,
at 774.
53. Due to the evidence of congressional intent in the Reconstruction debates and the
interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause by the dissenters in the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96-104 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting), other commentators have
characterized the privileges and immunities of citizens as being derived from the common law.
See McConnell, supra note 4, at 962 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
guarantee "basic civil rights, the common law rights possessed by all free persons").
54. See BuRDIeK, supra note 40, at 182 (enumerating positive laws that arose from the law
of nations, such as laws governing wars, territorial boundaries, the formation of governments,
property rights, and trading obligations); 1JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERiCAN LAw 2
(O.W. Holmes ed., 12th ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (describing the law of nations as a sys-
tem of positive law).
55. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 35, at 3a. According to Charles G. Fenwick, a
translator of Vattel,
The Romans often confused the Law of Nations with the Law of Nature, giving the
term "Law of Nations" (jus gentium) to the natural law, inasmuch as the latter was gen-
erally recognized and adopted by all civilized Nations. The EmperorJustinian's defi-
nitions of natural law, the Law of Nations, and civil law, are well known. "Natural law,"
he says, "is the law taught by nature to all animals." This is a definition of the Law of
Nature in its widest extent, and not the natural law peculiar to man which is derived
from his rational as well as from his animal nature. "The civil law," continues the Em-
peror, "is the law which is established by each people for itself and which is peculiar to
each State or civil society; whereas that law which is established among all men by
natural reason, and which is equally observed by every people, is called the Law of Na-
tions, since it is a law which all Nations follow."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
56. See STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 39, at 2 (referring to principles of the law of
nations relating to cases of international conflict).
57. VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 35, at 4a.
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and international law is entirely modern."5 Thus, although the words
were sometimes used in a different sense, the prevailing view was that
the phrase "law of nations" was synonymous with the Roman jus gen-
tium.
Both senses of the phrase "law of nations" are important, however,
in grasping the nineteenth-century understanding of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. As a system of sover-
eign states, the United States represented a model wherein both
principles of international law and the jus gentium were applicable.
Principles of international law governed relations among the states
while, under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2, those rights of citizens that were fundamental-rights of citi-
zens in all free governments--formed constituent elements of ajus
gentium among the American states.
1. Roman and natural law foundations
Under the Roman law, the jus gentium, or law of nations, was the
law developed to govern commercial dealings with peregrines, mem-
bers of non-Roman communities within the Roman Empire, and
other noncitizens.6 Justinian's Institutes draws a distinction between
the civil law and the jus gentium as follows:
All peoples who are governed by laws and customs use law which is
in part particular to themselves, in part a law common to all men:
the law which each people has established for itself is particular to
58. KENT, supra note 54, at 1 n.1 (O.W. Holmes). Frederick Tomkins and William George
Lemon, translators of the Roman writer Gaius, traced the evolution of thejus gentium and the
jus civ/lein ancient Rome:
The jus gentium was strictly a Roman idea, and however much contempt may have
been originally felt for the set of principles it included, these principles became at a
later period intimately commingled with the jus civile or municipal law, which, though
not absolutely extinguished, was in a very great degree modified by their introduction.
The conception of jus naturale arose from a combination of Roman and Greek
ideas.... The Romans chiefly valued thejus gentium for its supposed accordance with
this law of nature.... Law and politics have been in modem times immensely influ-
enced by this theory of the Roman jurists.
THE COMMENTARIES OF GAIus ON THEROMAN LAW 22-23 (Frederick Tomkins & William George
Lemon eds. & trans., Butterworths 1869).
59. This was the language used by Justice Bushrod Washington in Corfied v. Corye/4 6 F.
Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823), to describe the rights protected under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause.
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immuni-
ties which are, in their nature,fundamenta4 which belong, of right, to the citizens of aU
free governments, and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the sev-
eral states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, inde-
pendent, and sovereign.
See id. at 551 (emphasis added).
60. SeSJUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTEs 1.2.
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that state and is styled civil law as peculiarly of that state: but what
natural reason has established among all men is observed equally
by all nations and is designated jus Fentiurn, or the law of nations,
being that which all nations observe.
Thus, the common laws of nations were seen as being derived from
natural law. Under Roman law, the jus gentium governed the actions
of strangers within Roman territories, while the jus civile governed
the actions of the citizens of Rome." As John Norton Pomeroy, a
prominent nineteenth-century legal commentator, noted in his Intro-
duction to Municipal Law, the rights afforded individuals under the jus
gentium were somewhat less comprehensive than those afforded un-
der the jus civile63 Pomeroy characterized non-citizens living in Ro-
man territories as an "inferior population" who possessed certain lim-
ited rights, such as the right to hold property.6' He noted, however,
that the "citizen" possessed many rights that the non-citizen did not,
such as the right to intermarry with Roman citizens, the right to
"belong to the state," and the capacity to participate in the state's
government and to share in state property.' Pomeroy concluded
that this "inferior population" was "free personally, but subject politi-
cally, not slaves, yet not citizens. " 6
In fact, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens was only
one of many gradations of status that existed under the Roman law. '
The most extreme distinction made in civil status was the distinction
between slaves and freemen.!" According to Pomeroy's account,
slaves possessed "no civil rights; they were absolute property of the
61. Id. at 1.2.1.
62. See RIcHARD W. LEAGE, ROMAN PRIvATE LAw 1-2 (C.H. Ziegler ed., 2d ed. 1932).
63. See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 299 (describing the inferior status of noncitizens under
Roman law).
64. See id. (detailing rights afforded and denied to noncitizens by the Roman state).
65. Id. Pomeroy summarized the condition of strangers or, perigrin4 as follows:
As the strangers resident on Roman soil, and forming a portion of the common-
wealth, were not included in the embrace of the purely national law (lex civilis), and
took no part in civil affairs, they were left to the guidance of thejus gentiun, or natural
law, so far as it was recognized in these semi-barbarous epochs. With them the family
was natural; property was acquired, held, and transferred in a simple and natural
manner;, obligations depended upon the good faith and intention of the parties, and
not upon arbitrary forms of words.
Id. at 302.
66. Id. at 299.
67. According to Pomeroy, the term "status had reference to the capacity of the individual
to acquire and enjoy rights, and was separated into several gradations, ranging from the one in
which no civil rights were enjoyed, to the one which bestowed all the privileges and immunities
of the Roman citizen." Id. at 301. Pomeroy characterized the fundamental rights enjoyed by
citizens of Rome as "privileges and immunities," foreshadowing the language used in Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment. Se Smith, Citizenhip, supra note 11, at 696.
68. See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 301 (noting the division of status between slaves and
freemen).
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master, who held a power supreme over them, extending even to
life."69 In contrast, Pomeroy defined freemen as "[a]ll persons not in
the condition of servitude."0 This status, "however, did not confer
equal civil rights.' As previously noted, only citizens were entitled
to equal civil rights, whereas strangers, or perigrini, were entitled only
to those rights that existed under the jus gentium. Pomeroy con-
cluded that this division between citizens and non-citizens was "of the
utmost importance by the primitive law; in fact, it was only for the
citizen that the civil law existed."7 It was the civil law that gave to the
citizen "the coveted privileges which belonged to his order.
" Ts
The distinction between positive law and natural law persisted even
after the fall of the Roman Empire. For example, Samuel Pufendorf,
a seventeenth-century natural law theorist influential in nineteenth-
century America, also recognized a distinction between positive civil
law and natural law. He argued that the civil law in most states was a
positive expression of natural law and furthermore, that, as a dictate
of natural law, citizens were bound by whatever positive civil laws the
legislature enacted.74 Pufendorf reasoned that
Whatever laws... are enjoined by the supreme civil command for
their subjects to observe, under the threat of inflicting punishment
in a human court of law upon the violators of the same, are called
civil laws. These, whether taken from the body of the law of nature,
or from the body of positive law, or proceeding from the mere free
choice of the rulers, obtain the whole effect which they exert in a
civil court from the force of supreme power lending its authority to
them.75
Thus, by definition the civil law was the body of positive law which
was enforceable by the courts.
Pufendorf concluded that the commands of the natural law, al-
though creating a moral obligation, did not carry with them a legal





73. Id. at 302.
74. See 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUMJURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LiBRi Duo 160-
61 (James Brown Scott ed., William Abbot Oldfather trans., Clarendon Press 1931) (1672)
[hereinafter PUFENDORF, ELEMENTS] (analyzing the relationship between natural law and civil
law).
75. Id. at 160. Pufendorf believed that much of the natural law was indeed embodied in
the positive civil law. See id. ("[I] n all commonwealths, most features of the law of nature, at all
events such as those without which peace in the society itself cannot stand, have the force of
civil law, or have been included in the body of civil laws.").
76. See id. at 161. Pufendorf made it clear that natural obligations were morally binding
but not backed by the force of the state:
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state, however, that when no positive civil law governed a case, a
judge could resort to the natural law when he was compelled to ren-
der a judgment. Pufendorf described the role of the natural law as
follows:
[I]n all states natural laws support the civil law like a military re-
serve, so that when the latter has failed on some occurrence which
altogether demands a decision in a human court of law, there is re-
course to the laws of nature and to the analogy resulting from their
comparison, whereby, however, that which is borrowed, as it were,
from the law of nature takes on the force of civil law.7
Pufendorf, therefore, thought that the civil law of various nations re-
flected the natural law because it was based upon principles of rea-
son. As a consequence, those who form society must be presumed to
have desired to "establish nothing by civil laws which was contrary to
natural law" because only an "insane man" could wish to do such a
thing.78 However, only the civil law was enforceable by the state; the
[I]f, now, some law of nature, due to some actions of the civil command, has not taken
on the force of civil law, it obligates men, indeed, but in such a way that no action is
brought because of its violation, nor punishment there inflicted, but the prosecution
is left solely to the divine judgement-seat and to one's own consciousness of having
violated that law.
Id. at 160. Elsewhere, Pufendorf reiterated this point:
We may well discuss the division of obligations into natural and civil, not so much on
the ground that such a division explains the origin of obligations, as that it suggests
the basis of their force in common life. And so a natural obligation is that which
binds only by the force of natural law; a civil obligation that which is reinforced by
civil laws and authority.
2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DEJURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OcTo 385 (James Brown Scott ed.,
C.H. Oldfather & William Abbot Oldfather, trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1688) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter PUFENDORFJURE].
77. PUFENDORF, ELEMENTS, supra note 74, at 161. American courts also recognized that
positive law trumped principles of the law of nations. For example, in Lemmon v. People 20 N.Y.
562 (1860),Judge Thomas W. Clerke argued in his dissent that even though property in slaves
was not recognized under the law of nations, the positive provisions of the Constitution over-
rode the law of nations. Clerke argued that the majority was wrong
in supposing, because the law of nations refused to recognize slaves as property, the
several States of this Union were at liberty to do the same; forgetting that the compact,
by which the latter are governed in their relation towards each other, modifies the law
of nations in this respect... [therefore, no state is] permitted in its dealings or inter-
course with other States or their inhabitants to ignore the right to property in the la-
bor and service of persons in transitu from those States.
Id. at 642-43 (Clerke,J., dissenting).
78. PUFENDORFJURE, supra note 76, at 1133. Pufendorf continued, further analyzing the
presumption that nothing enacted by the legislature and made part of the civil law was contrary
to the principles of natural law:
[T]hose who in uniting to form a state bound themselves by a pact to obey the civil
laws, must certainly be understood to have presupposed that they would establish
nothing by civil laws which was contrary to natural law, and that the particular advan-
tage of states, which is the source and cause of civil laws, would not be repugnant to
their common end. Therefore, a civil law could, of course, be passed which is op-
posed to natural law; yet none but an insane man, and one who had in mind the de-
struction of the state, would wish to pass legislation of that kind.
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natural law was not.Y
In discussing the distinctions among the ancient Roman jus civile,
jus gentium, and jus naturale, Pufendorf concluded that the law of na-
ture and the law of nations were identical." He did not think that the
law of nations was binding upon states, however, because no com-
mon superior existed among sovereign states to establish and enforce
such a body of law.8 In making these distinctions, he laid the foun-
dation for the nineteenth-century categorization of laws in the same
manner.
Pufendorf further subdivided the natural law into categories based
on origin. Citing Grotius, he made a distinction between two types of
natural law commands-absolute and hypothetical. The former, he
argued, were independent of any institutions created by man, but be-
longed to all men, while the latter flowed from institutions estab-
lished by men.8 Thus, both Grotius and Pufendorf made a distinc-
tion between relative and absolute natural lights analogous to that
later made in the nineteenth century by Chancellor Kent in his Com-
mentaries on American Law.83
Pufendorf did not believe that all of the civil law reflected the
natural law." Although Pufendorf considered obedience to any en-
Id.
79. See id. at 1131 ("[N]o man is called to account, or assessed a penalty, in the proper
sense of the word, in states, for the violation of natural laws, which are not accorded the author-
ity of civil laws.").
80. See id. at 226-27. According to Pufendorf, the law of states was merely the law of nature
applied to states instead of individuals:
It is held by many that the law of nature and the law of nations are one and the same
thing, differing only in their external denomination. Hence Hobbes divides natural
law "into the natural law of men and the natural law of states, which is commonly
called the law of nations. The injunctions of both," he adds, "are the same; but be-
cause states, upon being constituted, take on the personal properties of men, the law,
which we call natural when speaking of the duty of individual men, on being applied
to whole states and nations or peoples, is called the law of nations." To this statement
we also fully subscribe.
Id. at 226 (citation omitted).
81. See id. ("Nor do we feel that there is any other voluntary or positive law of nations
which has the force of a law, properly so called, such as binds nations as if it proceeded from a
superior.").
82. See id. at 229.
83. See Smith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 702-04 (discussing Chancellor Kent's distinction
between absolute and relative rights).
84. See PUFENDORFJURE, supra note 76, at 199. Pufendorf did, however, presume that the
civil law should be construed to reflect the natural law.
All civil laws, indeed, presuppose or incorporate the general principles at least of
natural law, whereby the safety of the human race is maintained; and these latter are
by no means done away with by the former, which are merely added to them as the
distinct advantage of each state has required.
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acted positive civil laws to be a precept of the natural law,8 he did not
think that the civil law and the natural law were coextensive. Pufen-
doff did not believe that the principles of the natural law were neces-
sarily reflected in the civil codes of various nations or even of those
parts of the civil codes that various nations shared86 Instead, Pufen-
dorf asked, "what nation will claim so much for itself as to demand
that all other nations be measured by its customs, and to adjudge that
one barbarous which departs from them? 87 The fact that the princi-
ples of natural law could not necessarily be derived from the civil laws
of various nations did not mean, however, that the principles of natu-
ral law were not capable of being ascertained. For Pufendorf, the
process was one of deduction rather than induction88 Pufendorf
85. See id. at 230. According to Pufendorf, the natural obligation to obey positive civil laws
flowed from the voluntary adoption of the social compact by members of society:
[B]y our own consent we put ourselves under the direction of another whose com-
mands the law of nature bids us to obey. It is, indeed, certain, that violators of civil
laws mediately sin against the very law of nature by reason of such an agreement. Yet
there is this great distinction abiding between hypothetical natural laws and positive
civil laws, namely, that the reason for the former is sought from the condition of man-
kind as a whole, while the reason for the latter is taken from what appears to be of ad-
vantage for some certain state, or from the mere will of the legislator. And so positive
civil laws are not hypothetical precepts of the natural law, but they borrow their power
to obligate in a court of law, from a hypothetical precept.
Id.
86. SeeWalter Simons, Introduction, inPUFENDORFJURE, supra note 76, at 24a.
87. PuFENDORFJuRE, supra note 76, at 189.
88. See Simons, supra note 86, at 21a. Courts in the United States also acknowledged both
the inductive and deductive methods of arriving at the principles of the law of nations. For
example, in United States v. LaJeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551),
the court recognized the law of nations not as a static source of authority, but one that could
change over time as the propositions to which nations consented to be bound changed and as
men came closer through use of reason to embodying the principles of natural law in the posi-
tive law of nations. Citing both the inductive and deductive methods of determining the prin-
ciples of the law of nations, the court reasoned:
[The law of nations may be deduced, first, from the general principles of right and
justice, applied to the concerns of individuals, and thence to the relations and duties
of nations; or, secondly, in things indifferent or questionable, from the customary ob-
servances and recognitions of civilized nations; or, lastly, from the conventional or
positive law, that regulates the intercourse between states. What, therefore, the law of
nations is, does not rest upon mere theory, but may be considered as modified by
practice, or ascertained by the treaties of nations at different periods.
Id. at 846. An implication of this view is that there might be principles of the law of nations that
were not embodied in the positive law of allstates:
It does not follow.., that because a principle cannot be found settled by the consent
or practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period
the principle can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations. Nor
is it to be admitted, that no principle belongs to the law of nations, which is not uni-
versally recognised, as such, by all civilized communities, or even by those constitut-
ing, what may be called, the Christian states of Europe.
Id. In particular, the court emphasized the deductive approach to determining which princi-
ples were part of the law of nations.
I think it may be unequivocally affirmed, that every doctrine, that may be fairly de-
duced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the nature of
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thought that one could deduce the moral truths that formed the
principles of natural law by starting with certain axioms concerning
the nature of man." He advocated looking to the nature of man to
derive the axioms from which one could deduce the principles of
natural law."
Thus, in Pufendorf's work, there is evidence that the natural law
theorists relied upon by nineteenth-century legal scholars made a
sharp distinction between the natural law and positive civil law en-
acted in various nations. The principles of the law of nations were
viewed as being equivalent to the law of nature and were thought to
be represented in the civil law of most civilized countries.9' Pufen-
doff made it clear, however, that the civil law alone was binding, and
that only when the civil law was silent should judges refer to princi-
ples of natural law-principles of reason-in order to fill in the
92gaps.
moral obligation, may theoretically be said to exist in the law of nations; and unless it
be relaxed or waived by the consent of nations, which may be evidenced by their gen-
eral practice and customs, it may be enforced by a court ofjustice, whenever it arises
in judgment.
Id. Therefore, the court argued that where the positive law of the nation under whose jurisdic-
tion the case had been brought was not inconsistent with natural law, courts could apply prin-
ciples of natural law in deciding the case. See id. at 849-50.
89. See PUFENIDORF, JURE, supra note 76, at 26 (arguing that the principles of natural law
were capable of demonstration despite the human condition of freedom).
90. See id. at 205. According to Pufendorf, the principles of natural law flowed directly
from the nature of man:
[T]here is no more fitting and direct way to learn the law of nature than through
careful consideration of the nature, condition, and desires of man himself, although
in such a consideration other things should necessarily be observed which lie outside
man himself, and especially such things as work for his advantage or disadvantage.
Id. Pufendorf pointed out that this was also the position of Grotius in explaining the commis-
sion of actions that are not in conformity with the law of nature on the part of man: "For the
same reason Grotius shortly thereafter undertakes to derive this wickedness from a comparison
with nature when following sound reason. And yet in the words sound reason, as attributed to man,
there is involved a reference to the law of society as given to man by the Creator." Id. at 30.
91. According to Pufendorf, the natural law consisted of principles of reason that could
only be employed byjudges where the civil law was silent:
[E]ven where the civil laws are written, inasmuch as not every way in which human evil
may display itself can be expressly set forth, it is everywhere understood that natural
law and reason supplies the defect of civil laws, and in cases where an express sanction
is wanting, it lies at the discretion of the judge to define the punishments.
PUFENDORF,JURE, supra note 76, at 1187.
92. See id. Cases decided in the United States also presented the idea that only the positive
law should be enforced by courts, although it might be based upon principles of natural law.
For example, in Miller v. McQueny, 17 F. Cas. 335 (C.C.D. Ohio 1853) (No. 9,583), the court
observed that although the positive law may be founded upon principles of natural law, courts
of law may look only to the positive law in deciding cases:
It is for the people, who are sovereign, and their representatives, in making constitu-
tions, and in the enactment of laws, to consider the laws of nature, and the immutable
principles of right. This is a field which judges cannot explore. Their action is lim-
ited to conventional rights. They look to the law, and to the law only. A disregard of
this, by the judicial powers, would undermine and overturn the social compact.
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2. American commentators
The work of natural law theorists such as Pufendorf and Locke
formed the foundation upon which the work of nineteenth-century
American legal scholars was built. Foremost among such scholars
was Chancellor Kent, whose Commentaries on American Law was ex-
tremely influential within the nineteenth-century legal community.
According to Chancellor Kent, the jus civile of the Roman legal sys-
tem was analogous to the municipal law of the various states in the
United States. In his Commentaries, Kent stated that "MUNICIPAL
LAW is a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power of a
state. Municipal law, or the jus civile, is thus explained in the Insti-
tutes ofJustinian."9 Similarly, John Norton Pomeroy, another influ-
ential nineteenth-century legal commentator, wrote an entire treatise
on municipal law, which he identified as being analogous to the Ro-
man civil law.94 Therefore, the phrase "municipal law" as used in the
United States generally was deemed the equivalent of the "civil law."
Like Kent and Pomeroy, other nineteenth-century writers were also
acutely aware of this distinction between the civil law and the jus gen-
tium and the relation between the natural law and the jus gentium.9
According to Edward Poste, a translator of the Roman writer Gaius,
writing in 1875,
Modem writers would denote by Jus gentium the generally recog-
nized principles of justice, principles which may be discovered by
an induction of positive laws, that is, by a comparison of actually ex-
isting legislations, to be universally admitted, or, if not universally,
by a majority or by a number of nations; while by Natural law they
would denote a philosophic ideal, what might be otherwise de-
nominated the moral law or the divine law, the law that ought to be
everywhere established, though perhaps never yet adopted in ac-
tual legislation.9
The distinction between the jus gentium and natural law recognized
in the nineteenth century was based on the observation that princi-
ples of natural law were arrived at analytically through a deduction
from first principles whereas the principles of the jus gentium were ar-
rived at synthetically through an induction of positive laws.97 Nine-
Id. at 339; see also LaJeune Eugen 26 F. Cas. at 846.
93. 1 KENT, supra note 54, at 507.
94. See POMEROY, supra note 33.
95. See, e.g., GAius, ELEMENTS OFROMAN LAw 30 (Edward Poste trans., Clarendon Press 2d
ed., 1875); POMEROY, supra note 33, at 299-302; see also supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text
(discussing Pomeroy's views concerning the Roman law).
96. GAius, supra note 95, at 30.
97. AsJ.A.C. Grant has noted, "[t]hrough the stoics, [natural law] found its way into Ro-
man jurisprudence, where it was welcomed as an explanation of thejus gentium, and was chain-
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teenth century writers believed that as man's powers of reasoning
improved and as he was better able to grasp the principles of natural
law and embody them in the positive law of nations, there would be a
greater correspondence between the natural law and the jus gentium.
Thus, the conceptual framework prevalent in nineteenth-century
thought resembled that constructed by Pufendorf in his works on
natural law.
The prevalence of this conceptual framework in America led to its
application in analyzing the rights of citizens. For example, Pomeroy
divided the law governing the rights of individuals into two separate
"departments."9 According to Pomeroy, the first department con-
sisted of "[t] hose rules which relate to the rights inherent in persons
generally, as members of the state, or under its protection," while
the second department related to "[t]hose which define the condi-
tion and status of certain particular classes of persons, and their pe-
culiar rights and duties."'0 Thus, like Pufendorf, who distinguished
between hypothetical and absolute natural law commands, Pomeroy
also made a distinction analogous to Chancellor Kent's distinction
between absolute and relative natural rights.'0 ' Pomeroy described
the absolute natural rights of individuals as "the right of personal se-
curity, the right of personal liberty, the right to acquire and enjoy
private property, and the right of religious belief and worship."'02
Furthermore, in defining these rights he pointed to "English history"
and the "Magna Carta" as "the origin of these immunities."'t 3 He in-
dicated, however, that many of these rights were enumerated in the
United States Constitution:
The founders of our national Government, after having prosecuted
a long war to maintain what they claimed to be their rights under
the English constitution, were naturally zealous in preserving those
rights in their own organic law. The Constitution of the United
States is minute and specific in its safeguards against open or covert
infringement of the personal rights of the people.
pioned by the greatest of the Roman jurists, including Gaius, Ulpian, and Cicero." J.A.C.
Grant, The NaturalLaw Background of DueProcess, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 56,57 (1931).
98. See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 359.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Smith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 702-04, 717-18 (discussing the distinction made
by Chancellor Kent between absolute and relative natural rights and the similar distinction
found in the works of Pufendorf).
102. PoMEROY, supra note 33, at 360.
103. Id; see also infra notes 117-49 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread belief
among commentators that Americans had inherited all of these rights from the English com-
mon law, creating a sort of common law among the American states).
104. POMEROY, supra note 33, at 364.
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Thus, these fundamental rights found their way from the unwritten
English constitution to the written Constitution of the United States.
Pomeroy proceeded to enumerate the rights found in the Consti-
tution that embodied these common-law rights of individuals. He
listed not only those rights found in the Bill of Rights, including the
Ninth Amendment, but also rights found in the Constitution as
originally drafted such as the Bill of Attainder Clause,'05 Ex Post Facto
Clause,' 6 Habeas Corpus Clause, °7 and Contracts Clause! °e Signifi-
cantly, Pomeroy noted that the state constitutions already guaranteed
most of these rights since they contained "Bills of Rights similar to
the foregoing.""'" Thus, not only did Pomeroy acknowledge that
these rights were enjoyed by the citizens of all of the states, even
though the federal Constitution may not have been applicable to the
states prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, but he also
termed the enumeration of these rights a "Bill of Rights" even
though the rights that he listed included many that were found out-
side the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution."'
Pomeroy addressed not only those rights available generally to all
persons, but also those rights that were limited to citizens. In discuss-
ing the "peculiar rights" of citizens, Pomeroy noted that these rights
flowed from an individual's status as a citizen of the United States or
of a particular state."' He concluded: "[t]hese immunities may be
summed up in the fact of political protection, as distinguished from
the simple personal protection which is the result of the more gen-
eral rights of life, liberty, property, and religion.1 2  Among these
"peculiar rights" of citizenship, Pomeroy counted the "unlimited
right to hold and enjoy property," which did not necessarily exist for
105. SeeU.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c. 1.
106. See id.
107. Seeid. § 9, cl. 2.
108. See id. § 10, cl. 1. Not only did Pomeroy enumerate rights outside of the Bill of Rights,
but he also included certain rights that have not been incorporated, such as the Seventh
Amendment guarantee of civil jury trial and the Second Amendment guarantee of the right of
the people to keep and bear arms. See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 364-66.
109. See POMEROY, supra note 33, at 366. Pomeroy explicitly referenced a number of provi-
sions of the English law, as well as the federal and state constitutions, as embodying these
rights:
By the English law, as fundamentally established in Magna Chara, the Petition of
Right, the habeas corpus act, and the Bill of Rights, and by the American law, as based
on Federal and State constitutions, the personal liberty of the individual is guaranteed
in the most solemn manner against private force and public aggression.
Id. at 372.
110. See id. at 364-66 (discussing the rights embodied in the Constitution).
111. See id. at 419.
112. Id.
376
1997] NATURAL LAW, ARTICLE IV, AND SECTION ONE 377
aliens, who were often prevented from owning real estate."" A citizen
of the United States also possessed the "right to the protection of his
Government at home and abroad." 4 Finally, Pomeroy noted that
Congress had passed legislation that granted to United States citizens
"particular privileges" such as the "exclusive right to carry on the
coasting trade among the ports of the United States."15  Pomeroy
cautioned, however, that the rights of citizenship did not encompass
political rights or "special privilege[s]," such as the right to vote."
6
Thus, distinctions present in the Roman law between the jus gentium
and the jus civile found their way into nineteenth-century analysis of
the legal system in the United States and the rights that individuals in
general, and citizens in particular, enjoyed under it.
B. The Common Law
The common law, like the Roman conception of the jus gentium,
was a body of positive law developed over time that reflected princi-
ples of natural law or natural reason. Commentators have argued
that ancient Roman law beginning with the work of Henry de Brac-
ton heavily influenced the common law." 7 As Chancellor Kent re-
marked in his Commentaries, however, the English common law devel-
oped greater protections for individual liberty than had existed
under the Roman Code."" The privileges and immunities of citizen-
ship in America, borrowed from the civil as well as the common law,
were far more comprehensive than those that had existed in ancient
Rome."9 However, despite the fact that personal rights found under
the Roman law may have been less extensive than those found in the
common law, the concept of the jus gentium and that of a common
113. Seeid.at 423.
114. Id. at 424. One of the privileges or immunities described by Pomeroy was political
protection. This reference indicates that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may encompass
the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause. However, the scope of the guarantee may be
enlarged under the Equal Protection Clause since the Privileges or Immunities Clause only
applies to citizens. Citizens have the right to protection, not only domestically, but also when
they are traveling in foreign countries.
115. Id. at 425.
116. Id. ("The right of citizenship must not be confounded with the right of suffrage, and of
taking part in the administration of Government. This is a special privilege confined to a com-
paratively small class....").
117. See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law Background" of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149, 172 (1928) (asserting that Bracton's importance stemmed from his synthesis
of common law and the Roman idea of higher law); Edward D. Re, The Roman Contribution to the
Common Law, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 447, 471-72 (1961) (maintaining that Bracton's Romanism
profoundly influenced English common law). Bracton was an ecclesiastic and royal judge who
was Chief'Justiciar of England under Henry III.
118. Sw KENT, supra note 54, at 547-48.
119. Seeid.at547.
THE AMERICAN UNiVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:351
law among states may be used interchangeably.
Prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts constru-
ing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 of-
ten stated that the Clause guaranteed certain common-law rights.'"
Thus, it is possible that the Clause was intended to guarantee com-
mon-law rights recognized by all of the states in the United States. 2'
Antebellum case law'22 and the opinions of certain antebellum legal
scholars'29 support this interpretation of the Clause. Furthermore,




Many antebellum cases recognized the existence of an American
"common law," derived from the English common law. In Bank of
Augusta v. Earle,'2 for example, the following was argued before the
Supreme Court: "It is [the] common law, which in every state and
nation protects and secures the great body of our rights, and en-
forces obligations founded in morality. In all civilized nations, this
law is substantially the same."26 Similarly, Justice Thompson, in his
dissent in Wheaton v. Peters,'2 gave a summary of the relation between
the natural law and the common law which recognizedjudicial power
to sanction the "application of the dictates of natural justice, and of
cultivated reason, to particular cases." 2 Like the jus gentium, the
common law was the product of many generations exercising their
collective wisdom to determine principles conformable to reason.
Justice Thompson argued that in deducing the principles of the
common law, one should ask whether reasonable men would assent
to be governed by such principles. "[T]he true mode of ascertaining
a moral right," he contended, was "to inquire whether it is such as
the reason, the cultivated reason of mankind must necessarily assent
to.)
29
120. See generally Smith, Privieges, supra note 23 (discussing case law arising under the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause).
121. Michael Conant has also argued that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment was intended to provide a federal guarantee for these common-law rights
against the state governments. See Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY LJ. 785, 818-19 (1982).
122. See infra Part I.B.1.
123. See infra Part I.B.2.
124. See infra Part I.B.3.
125. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
126. Id. at 536.
127. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1934).
128. See id. at 671-72 (Thompson,J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 672. This conception of the common law as founded upon general moral prin-
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Justice Thompson, citing Justice Joseph Story's Commentaries as
authority, contended that the inhabitants of the American colonies
retained the common-law rights of Englishmen until a new govern-
ment might decide to alter them.'" In Justice Thompson's opinion,
these English common-law rights formed part of the positive law of
the United States when the people adopted the Declaration of Rights
of 1774.' 3' Thompson's words demonstrate that one need not look to
abstract principles of natural law in order to determine what com-
mon rights were enjoyed by citizens of the United States; rather, one
can look to a well-developed body of positive law to determine the
nature of those rights.
ciples that had been recognized over time was also expressed in argument before the Supreme
Court in Bank of Augusta v. Earl.
The common law is said to be "common right." The expression seems a quaint one,
but it is true to the sense. Right is antecedent to all law. The object of law is to secure
right; not so much to define as to enforce it, and to prevent wrong.... It is this com-
mon law, which in every state and nation protects and secures the great body of our
rights, and enforces obligations founded in morality. In all civilized nations, this law is
substantially the same. Even in nations not admitted to be within that description,
there is a strong resemblance: for example, in the laws of the Hindoos. The reason is
obvious. Whether expounded in codes, or disclosed byjudicial investigation and de-
cision, the great principles ofjustice are identical; and it is the aim of all law to culti-
vate, extend, and enforce them. Statutes are but few in comparison. They are excep-
tions; the common law is the great body. The legislator acts chiefly upon matters
which are indifferent.
Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 535-36. Constitutions were identified as embodying these common-
law rights:
Constitutions of states are frames of government. They give no civil rights. The ut-
most they aim at, in this respect, is to secure some of the most important of them, (as
existing things,) by a solemn assertion of them, by excepting them from the en-
croachments of power, or by placing around them strong and permanent guards.
This is the proper office of a bill of rights. In all forms of government, these rights are
the same; however they may be trodden down in arbitrary ones, where there is no in-
dependentjudiciary to protect them. The common law acknowledges and aids them.
Id. at 536.
130. See lheaton, 33 U.S. at 687-88 (Thompson,J., dissenting). Justice Thompson invoked
Justice Story's Commentaries as authority supporting his views:
Mr. Justice Story recognises the same principle in his Commentaries. Englishmen,
says he, removing to another country, must be deemed to carry with them those rights
and privileges which belong to them in their native country, and that the plantations
formed in this country were to be deemed a part of the ancient dominions, and the
subjects inhabiting them to belong to a common country, and to retain their former
rights and privileges. That the universal principle has been (and the practice has con-
formed to it), that the common law is our birthright and inheritance, and that our an-
cestors brought hither with them, upon their immigration, all of it which was applica-
ble to their situation. The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon
the original foundation of the common law.
Id. (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 688 (Thompson, J., dissenting) ("The old congress, in the year 1774, unani-
mously resolved, that the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England.").
132. For example, among the important English statutes conferring rights to the English
people were the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus Act, the English Bill of
Rights, and the Act of Settlement. SeeCURTIS, supra note 3, at 75.
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More specifically, the Privileges and Immunities Clause was tied to
the protection of common-law rights in several antebellum cases.
The court in Ward v. Mayland,13 for example, asserted that the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 was designed to
guarantee certain rights defined by the common law.'34 Similarly,
Chief Justice Williams made the following remarks in Phoenix Insur-
ance Co. v. Commonwealth,'35 distinguishing between the fundamental
privileges and immunities guaranteed under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause and the charter of incorporation at issue in the case:
This clause of the Constitution... was adopted to secure the natu-
ra, common, and fundamental rights of the citizen, such as pertain to
all free-born, whether male or female, young or old, rich or poor.
With the securing these natural and common rights by the gov-
ernment comes correlative duties by the citizen to bear its burdens,
defend its rights, and perform such duties as may legally be en-
joined, many of them an artificial being, a mere legal entity, could
neither bear, observe, nor perform.'
Therefore, prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment,
courts often identified the rights guaranteed under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause as being common-law or natural rights of Ameri-
can citizens. Despite recognition of the origin of these rights in the
common law, courts emphasized the fact that they were made bind-
ing through their embodiment in the constitutional text.
2. Commentators
Several antebellum commentators also espoused the view that
there existed an American common law derived from the English
common law. In his Commentaries on American Law, Chancellor Kent,
whom Justice Thompson cited,1 37 described the way in which these
common rights of Englishmen attached to the colonists and subse-
quently became the entitlement of American citizens:
The inhabitants of the colonies of Plymouth and Massachusetts, in
the infancy of their establishments, declared by law that the free
enjoyment of the liberties which humanity, civility, and Christianity
133. 79 U.S. (12Wal.) 430 (1871).
134. See id. at 430. Justice Field seems to have given the Clause this interpretation in Butch-
ers Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 760 (1884), decided after the Slaughter-House
Cases. According to Justice Field, "[t]he States could not previously [before passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment] have interfered with their privileges and immunities, or any other
privileges and immunities which citizens enjoyed under the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Any attempted impairment of them could have been as successfully resisted
then as now." Id.
135. 68 Ky. (5 Bush) 68 (1868).
136. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
137. SeeWheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591,671-72 (1834) (Thompson,J., dissenting).
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called for was due to every man in his place and proportion, and
ever had been, and ever would be, the tranquillity and stability of
the commonwealth. They insisted that they brought with them
into this country the privileges of English freemen; and they de-
fined and declared those privileges with a caution, sagacity, and
precision that have not been surpassed by their descendants.
Those rights were afterwards, in the year 1692, on the receipt of
their new charter, reasserted and declared.Iss
Similarly, Justice Story noted in his Commentaries that the Declaration
of 1774 entitled the colonists to the "common rights" of English-
men.'3 According to Justice Story, the Congress of 1774 unani-
mously resolved:
"That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of Eng-
land, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of
being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of
that law." They further resolved, "that they were entitled to the
benefit of such of the English statutes as existed at the time of their
colonization, and which they have by experience respectively found
to be applicable to their several and local circumstances." They
also resolved, that their ancestors at the time of their emigration
were "entitled" (not to the rights of men, of expatriated men, but)
"to all the rights liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born
subjects within the realm of England."
140
Thus, the idea that the civil rights of the people existed anterior to
the establishment of the government, that these rights were ex-
pressed in a positive common law, and that these rights were founded
upon principles of reason or natural law, was prevalent during the
period between ratification of the Constitution and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the relationship between Ar-
ticle IV, Section 2 and protection of these common-law rights was
recognized by antebellum commentators.
3. The Slaughter-House Cases
Recognition of the fact that the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens found their origin in the common law extended beyond early
nineteenth-century case law and commentary. Indeed, this view
found expression even after ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the opinions of Supreme Court justices construing the
138. 2 KENT, supra note 54, at 1-2.
139. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 105-06
n.4 (Thomas M. Cooley ed., 4th ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1873) (1833) [hereinafterSTORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION].
140. Id. (citingJournal of Congress, Declaration of Rights of the Colonies, Oct. 14, 1774, at
27-31).
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Amendment. The Slaughter-House dissenters asserted that the terms
"privileges and immunities" referred to certain "common rights" of
citizens of the United States that had existed prior to the formation
of government. "' In his dissent, Justice Field opined that "[t]he
[fourteenth] amendment was adopted to obviate objections which
had been raised and pressed with great force to the validity of the
Civil Rights Act, and to place the common rights of American citizens
under the protection of the National government.""2 These
"common rights" of American citizens were enumerated in a variety
of documents comprising the organic law of the United States, in-
cluding the various state constitutions and bills of rights, the United
States Constitution, the Declaration Independence of 1776, and the
Declaration of Rights of 1774. As Justice Field stated in his dissent,
echoing the remarks ofJustice Story and Chancellor Kent in their in-
fluential works on American law," these rights were inherited from
the English common law:
The common law of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of
the United States. It was brought to this country by the colonists,
together with the English statutes, and was established here so far
as it was applicable to their condition. That law and the benefit of
such of the English statutes as existed at the time of their coloniza-
tion, and which they had by experience found to be applicable to
their circumstances, were claimed by the Congress of the United
Colonies in 1774 as a part of their "indubitable rights and liber-
ties."4"
This was the position urged by plaintiffs' counsel, who stated that the
phrase "privileges and immunities," as used in the Constitution,
"undoubtedly" referred to "the personal and civil rights which usage,
141. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 96-97 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting)
(stating that privileges and immunities are those rights that are fundamental and belong to citi-
zens of all free governments).
142. Id. at 93 (Field, J., dissenting). Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the terms "privileges"
and "immunities" referred to the traditional rights of freemen possessed by citizens since the
time of Magna Charta. See id. at 54. According to plaintiffs' counsel, the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause dictated that the citizen's "'privileges and immunities' must not be impaired, and
all the privileges of the English Magna Charta in favor of freemen are collected upon him and
overshadow him as derived from this amendment." Id. Plaintiffs' counsel also stated that the
message of the Fourteenth Amendment was as follows:
To the State governments it says: "Let there be no law made or enforced to diminish
one of the privileges and immunities of the people of the United States;" nor law to
deprive them of their life, liberty, property, or protection without trial. To the people
the declaration is: "Take and hold this your certificate of status and of capacity, the
Magna Charta of your rights and liberties." To the Congress it says: "Take care to en-
force this article by suitable laws."
Id. at 54-55.
143. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
144. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 104-05 (FieldJ, dissenting).
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tradition, the habits of society, written law, and the common senti-
ments of people have recognized as forming the basis of the institu-
tions of the country."'45
Arguably, the states had consented to respect certain principles of
comity under Article IV, Section 2. The independence of the states
and their power of self-government would not be trammeled if they
had agreed voluntarily to be bound by the Constitution and the prin-
ciples of comity embodied in its provisions. Furthermore, the federal
government represented a superior sovereignty that was created
based upon the consent of all of the people through ratification of
the Constitution.'46 Therefore, the condition of the states in relation
to each other was not entirely that of sovereign foreign nations.'4
The United States constituted a single union of the people, who had
established a government superior, in certain respects, to that of the
states.'4 The people constituting the union had a sphere of power
that they were entitled to exercise, certain privileges that they re-
tained as both persons and citizens in establishing both the state gov-
ernments and the federal government. Although it is certain that
they delegated the power to regulate these privileges to their govern-
ment,'49 they did not wholly relinquish or forfeit these privileges
when establishing the state or federal governments.
II. THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE: A "REPUBLICAN" FORM OF
GOVERNMENT
In interpreting the provisions found in Article IV, one must de-
termine not only the nature of the rights guaranteed, but also the na-
ture of the protection afforded. Do the provisions of Article IV such
as the Privileges and Immunities Clause afford any form of substan-
tive protection for a particular set of fundamental rights, or do they
forbid merely discriminatory legislation passed by the legislature of
one state and directed against the citizens of another? It is debatable
145. Id. at 55.
146. See Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation
and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 249, 293 (1997) [hereinafter Smith, Analysis)
(discussing the federal structure established under the Constitution).
147. See id. at 310-28 (arguing that the Constitution was conceived of as a compact among
the people as well as the states).
148. See id. at 313-28 (arguing that the Constitution represented a partial consolidation of
the states).
149. For example, in the most important case interpreting the Privileges and Immunities
Clause prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Corfield v. Coyell, 6 F. Cas. 546
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (3,320),Justice Bushrod Washington noted that the fundamental privileges
and immunities of citizens guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2 remained "subject neverthe-
less to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole." Id. at 552.
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whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause was intended to afford
substantive protection of fundamental rights by guaranteeing certain
privileges and immunities of citizenship to individual citizens against
the actions of their own state governments.'5 It has been suggested,
however, that substantive protection of a uniform set of privileges
and immunities prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
could have been intended (1) as a result of application of the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, (2) through an inherent power of the federal
government to protect its own citizens in the exercise of the rights of
United States citizenship, (3) through application of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and finally (4) through the Guaran-
tee Clause of Article IV, Section 4.25' The last of these possibilities is
most consistent with the meaning of the Constitution as originally
drafted, as well as the nineteenth-century understanding of the Con-
stitution, but is by no means certain. Even if the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause were not intended to provide substantive protection
for fundamental rights, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, guaran-
teeing a "Republican Form of Government" to the states, may have
been intended to fill this gap. As Professor William E. Nelson has
noted, mid-nineteenth-century legal ideology involved notions of
"equality," "natural law," and "the nature of republican society."' 5
Such references may reflect a recognition that the Framers intended
to provide more than a mere guarantee of equality among the states.
In drafting Article IV, they may have intended to delegate to the fed-
150. This was an alleged "inadequacy" of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Chester
James Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article Four, 9WM. & MARYL. REV. 1, 21 (1967).
151. See id. RepresentativeJames Wilson (R-Iowa) supported the second alternative in argu-
ing that a constitutional amendment was not necessary in order for Congress to exercise the
power of protecting citizens of the United States from the actions of state governments. Wilson
stated:
I assert that we posses the power to do those things which Governments are organized
to do; that we may protect a citizen of the United States against a violation of his rights
by the law of a single State; that by our laws and our courts we may intervene to main-
tain the proud character of American citizenship; that this power permeates our
whole system, is a part of it, without which the States can run riot over every funda-
mental right belonging to citizens of the United States; that the right to exercise this
power depends upon no express delegation but runs with the rights it is designed to
protect ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1119 (1866). Representative Amos P. Granger of New York
made a similar appeal to the "Republican Form of Government" Clause. See CONG. GLOBE,
35th Cong. 952, 2d Ses. (1859). Representative Bingham, however, thought a constitutional
amendment was necessary to confer to Congress power to enforce the guarantees already pres-
ent in the Constitution. According to Bingham, "no state ever had the right.., to abridge the
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic although many of them have assumed
and exercised the power, and that without remedy." Id. at 2542.
152. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO
JUDICiAL DOCrluNE 13, 24, 36 (1988).
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eral government the power to maintain the integrity of the federal
system by ensuring that the fundamental rights of citizenship were
recognized in each of the states.
One possible interpretation of the Guarantee Clause is that it
merely provided a guarantee to the state governments against usur-
pation of the government, and not to the people of the state. ' The
Clause provides, however, for protection from internal as well as ex-
ternal violence against the government or people of the state.IM The
guarantee of a "Republican Form of Government," therefore, would
be mere surplusage under this interpretation of the Clause. Fur-
thermore, affording protection to the state governments from some-
thing within their power to control, namely the form of the govern-
ment they themselves are entrusted with running, seems illogical.
Arguably, consistent with the plain language found in the text it-
self, the Guarantee Clause was intended to be a national guarantee to
the people of each state against "nonrepublican" forms of govern-
ment."' In a sense, it was also a guarantee to all of the people of the
United States that their rights would be protected through the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause, which entitled citizens to the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states.'5
If one tyrannical state government decided to abridge these rights
of citizenship, then both resident and nonresident citizens would be
unable to enjoy these privileges and immunities within the tyrannical
state. The fourth section of Article IV of the Constitution arguably
prevents such abridgments of the privileges of citizenship by provid-
ing as follows: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect
each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature,
or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.'
5 7
It is noteworthy that this provision is placed in that article of the
Constitution governing interactions among the states. Other provi-
sions in Article IV, such as the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, establish the reciprocal relations
153. This interpretation of the Clause was rejected in Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700,
721 (1869).
154. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall ... protect each of [the states]
against Invasion... [and] domestic Violence.").
155. The fact that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to raise nonjusticiable po-
litical questions has reduced the value of this guarantee. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
156. SeeU.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
157. Id. § 4.
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among the states. '8 The location of the Guarantee Clause in Article
IV indicates that it was also involved in maintenance of the federal
system and its stability.5 9 As James Madison noted in The Federalist No.
43:
In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed
of republican members, the superintending government ought
clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic
or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such
a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the po-
litical institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that
the forms of government under which the compact was entered
into should be maintained. 16
Madison justified this provision by asking, "who can say what experi-
ments may be produced by the caprice of particular states, by the
ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of
foreign powers?" 6' Despite the fact that the Framers of the Constitu-
tion seemed to understand what they meant by a "Republican Form
of Government," there was controversy concerning the scope of the
Guarantee Clause, particularly during the nineteenth century.
A. Original Intent and Natural Law Background
What is meant by the phrase "a republican form of government"
has been the subject of much debate. 62 James Madison attempted to
give a definition of a "republic" while trying to demonstrate that the
Constitution did indeed establish a general government that was re-
publican in form. Madison's definition is not particularly precise:
If we resort for a criterion, to the different principles on which dif-
158. See id. § 9 (Full Faith and Credit Clause); id. § 2 (Privileges and Immunities Clause).
159. For recent interpretations of the Guarantee Clause, see Charles L. Black, Jr., On Wony-
ingAbout the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469 (1984); DeborahJones Merritt, The Guarantee
Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Centuy, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988). The fact
that the Supreme Court has interpreted the Clause to raise nonjusticiable political questions
has effectively emasculated this valuable provision maintaining the integrity of the federal sys-
tem. See Pacijfic States, 223 U.S. at 149-52.
160. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 282 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976).
161. Id. at 282-83.
162. There seems to be little in the way of legislative history indicating the original meaning
ascribed to the phrase. Commentators often note thatJohn Adams stated that he'never un-
derstood" what the Guarantee Clause meant and "believe[d] no man ever did or ever will."
WILLIAM WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONsTrruTION 72 (1972) (quoting Let-
ter from John Adams to Mercy Otis Warren (July 20, 1807)). For a discussion of the history of
the Clause, see generally id.; Arthur E. Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A
Study in Constitutional Desuetude 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 565-69 (1962); Merritt, supra note 159
(arguing that the Guarantee Clause implies modest restraint on federal power to interfere with
state autonomy); Thomas A. Smith, Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of
the Guarantee Clause, 93 YALE LJ. 561 (1984) (arguing that the Clause embodies rule of law val-
ues).
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ferent forms of government are established, we may define a re-
public to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
body of the people; and is administered by persons holding their
offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behav-
ior."
Despite the lack of precision, from the above passage it is evident that
republics, at a minimum, derived their political authority from the
people and not from a subset of the people or a single individual. In
The Federalist No. 43, Madison noted that the current state govern-
ments were republican in nature.'64 Therefore, some evidence of
what constituted a "republican" form of government may also be de-
rived from examining the state constitutions of this period.
In discussing the reference to a "Republican Form of Government"
found in the Guarantee Clause, Madison observed the textual distinc-
tion between the guarantee of a republican form of government and
"protection against invasion"'65 and "protection against domestic vio-
lence."'66 Based on Madison's definition of a "republican form" of
163. THE FEDERALIsT No. 39, at 251 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). Madison noted that there had been "extreme inaccuracy" in the ways in
which the term "republican" had been used to designate different governments. See id. ("What,
then, are the distinctive characters of the republican form? Were an answer to this question to
be sought, not by recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by political writers,
to the constitution of different States, no satisfactory one would ever be found."). Madison ar-
gued that Holland, Venice, Poland, and England had been inaccurately characterized as
.republics" when, in fact, the governments of these countries had monarchical and aristocratic
aspects. See id. at 251-52. The approach Madison took in arguing that the general government
was republican in form was somewhat complex. Madison observed:
In order to ascertain the real character of the government, it may be considered in re-
lation to the foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its
ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers; to the extent of
them; and to the authority by which future changes in the government are to be in-
troduced.
Id. at 253. Thus, Madison pointed to the procedures for ratification, the structure of the legis-
lature and limits on its power, and provisions for amendment of the Constitution as giving
clues to the nature of "Republican" government. See id. at 253-57.
164. Madison maintained that the particular form of government in the states was not
locked in by the Clause. The only requirement was that the form be "republican" in nature:
Whenever the States may choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a
right to do so, and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only restriction
imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange republican for antirepublican Con-
stitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
Id. at 292.
165. Id. at 292-93 ("A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts
composing it. The latitude of the expression here used, seems to secure each state not only
against foreign hostility, but against ambitious or vindictive enterprizes of its more powerful
neighbours.").
166. With respect to this provision, Madison stated:
It has been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which properly speaking
are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of
that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well
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government and the placement of the Guarantee Clause next to
these other clauses in Article IV, the purpose of the Guarantee
Clause was most likely, in part, to ensure that the governments of the
states would derive their powers directly from the people of the state.
The core meaning of the Guarantee Clause was that the ultimate sov-
ereignty was to reside with the people.' 67
Several commentators, such as Pufendorf, had already described
this idea of republicanism in their influential works on natural law.'6
Pufendorf argued that even if the people were to establish a king,
they would retain certain rights that were "consistent with the nature
of a state."'6 Government was established by the people through
compact, and the people retained the ultimate sovereignty over the
government that they had established to protect their rights of per-
son and property.17 Therefore, not only the federal government, but
also the state governments must be seen as governments of delegated
powers.
by the most democratic, as the other Cantons. A recent and well-known event among
ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature.
Id. at 293 (referring, most likely, to Shays' Rebellion).
167. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 159, at 24 n.130 (noting that Samuel Johnson's 1786 dic-
tionary defined "republican" as "placing the government in the people"). James Madison
wrote that a republic is "a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from
the great body of the people." THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 251 (Tames Madison) (Edward Mead
Earle ed., 1976); see also id. No. 37, at 234 ("The genius of Republican liberty, seems to demand
on one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people; but, that those en-
trusted with it should be kept in dependence on the people .... ."); id. No. 10, at 62 (stating
that a republic is characterized by "the delegation of the Government... to a small number of
citizens elected by the rest. .. ."). Similarly, Alexander Hamilton stated that the"fundamental
maxim of republican government.., requires that the sense of the majority should prevail."
Id. No. 22, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. No. 57, at 384 (James Madison or Alexan-
der Hamilton) ("The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republi-
can government."). Finally, Justice James Wilson stated that republican governments were
based on the "principle[] that the Supreme Power re[s]ides in the body of the people."
Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419, 457 (1793). Modern commentators have also recog-
nized the central importance of the notion of popular sovereignty in interpreting the Guaran-
tee Clause. Akhil Amar, for example, has called this the "central pillar of Republican Govern-
ment." Akhil R. Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Soereignty,
Majority Rule, and theDenominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994).
168. See Simons, supra note 86, at 43a (discussing the nature of sovereignty). Walter Si-
mons, commenting on Pufendorfs Dejure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, stated:
[Pufendorf] thinks that the power of the ruler is nothing else than the combined
power of all the individuals who, organizing into a State, bestowed on the incumbent
of the sovereign office a part of their power, which they held on account of their natu-
ral freedom. Here Pufendorf appears as the direct precursor of the theory concern-
ing the origin and extent of human authority which forms the basis of the Constitu-
tion of the United States of America.
Id.
169. Id. at 1088 ("Now when a king is named by a people on their own volition, each person
is presumed in that act to have reserved for himself all of his rights which are consistent with
the nature of a state.").
170. See Smith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 708, 715-16, 719-20 (discussing the theories of
Locke, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui).
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American commentators espoused similar views. They believed
that the residual sovereignty, including the pre-existing privileges of
the people, was retained by the people and remained outside the
reach of any government they might establish.' 7' For example, citing
Chief Justice Jay, Justice Story adhered to this view of the state in his
Commentaries.'7 2 According to justice Story, "[s] trictly speaking, in our
republican forms of government the absolute sovereignty of the na-
tion is in the people of the nation; and the residuary sovereignty of
each State, not granted to any of its public functionaries, is in the
people of the State."'7 This view is wholly consistent with Lockean
social compact theory.'74 Because the rights of citizens, either abso-
171. This inference that a "Republican Form of Government" caried with it certain rights
possessed by the people that no government could infringe was expressed by antislavery writers
prior to ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. See WIECEK, supra note 162, at 163. Fur-
thermore, "[t]o some Republicans, as to their antislavery predecessors, the phrase 'republican
form of government' incorporated the ideals of the Declaration of Independence in the Con-
stitution." Id. at 183. Charles Sumner, in particular, was an adherent of this view. Sumner in-
troduced the following resolution into Congress, which was subsequently rejected:
To carry out the guarantee of a republican form of government, and to enforce the
prohibition of slavery; Be it resolved.., that in all states lately declared to be in rebel-
lion there shall be no oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly invested with peculiar
privileges or powers, and there shall be no denial of rights, civil or political, on ac-
count of color or race, but all persons shall be equal before the law, whether in the
courtroom or at the ballot box; and this statute, made in pursuance of the constitu-
tion, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any
such state to the contrary notwithstanding.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 592 (1866). Sumner's proposal was particularly radical in
that it indicated that in a republican form of government all were entitled to equal political as
well as civil rights-a proposition that most Republicans rejected. See infra Part III.B (observing
that political rights were not intended to be guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment).
However, other Republicans such as Senator James Nye (Nev.) and Representative Roswell
Hart (N.Y.) stated that inherent in a "Republican Form of Government" were certain funda-
mental rights of the people. See Akhil R Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment,
101 YALE LJ. 1193,1242 (1992).
172. See STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 145-47 (explain-
ing that in republican forms of government all power was ultimately derived from the people).
173. Id. at 146-47 (citation omitted).
174. In fact, Justice Samuel Chase seemed to identify the principles of republicanism with
social compact theory in his opinion in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In a famous
passage,Justice Chase stated:
There are certain vital principles in our free Republican governments, which will deter-
mine and overrule an apparent andflagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize
manifest injustice by positive laur, or to take away that security forpersonal liberty, or private
property, for the protection whereof the government was established. An actof the leg-
islature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the greatfirst principles of the social com-
pact cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.
Id. at 388. In Minorv. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165-66 (1874), the notions of republicanism, citi-
zenship, and social compact theory were united in the discussion of whether, after the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, a woman who was a citizen of the United States and of Missouri
had a constitutional right to vote. Similarly, in United States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court
noted the tie between republicanism and the Fourteenth Amendment:
The equality of the rights of citizens is a principle of republicanism. Every republican
government is in duty bound to protect all its citizens in the enjoyment of this princi-
ple, if within its power. That duty was originally assumed by the States; and it still re-
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lute natural fights or those relative natural rights flowing from the
social compact creating the body politic, existed anterior to the estab-
lishment of the government, these rights were considered beyond the
power of the government to abridge or deny. 75 Justice Story reiter-
ated this view when discussing the Constitution of the United States:
[In the United States] the government is the government of the
people; all its officers are their officers, and they can exercise no
rights or powers but such as the people commit to them. In such a
case the silence of the Constitution argues nothing. The trial by
jury, the freedom of the press, and the liberty of conscience are not
taken away, because they are not secured. They remain with the
people among the mass of ungranted powers, or find an appropri-
ate place in the laws and institutions of each particular State.
In Justice Story's opinion, these "ungranted powers" could not be
presumed to be given up to any of the governments established by
the people, whether or not these rights were expressly secured. In-
deed, these rights could not be presumed to be given up either to the
federal government or the various state governments.
B. The Nineteenth-Century Understanding
This equation of nondelegated rights retained by the people with a
"Republican Form of Government" was made by members of Con-
gress during the Reconstruction Era as well.'7 For example, Senator
James W. Nye of Nevada stated, "[T]he enumeration of personal
rights in the Constitution to be protected, prescribes the kind and
quality of the governments that are to be established and maintained
in the states."78 Nye argued that Congress could enforce the consti-
tutional guarantee of a republican form of government, "making the
enumeration of personal and natural rights and the protective fea-
tures of the Constitution the definition and test of what is republican
mains there. The only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the
States do not deny the right. This the [Fourteenth] amendment guarantees, but no
more. The power of the national government is limited to enforcement of this guar-
anty.
92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875).
175. SeeSmith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 689-90, 696, 704, 730.
176. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrrUTION, supra note 139, at 212.
177. The Guarantee Clause had been cited as a source of authority for congressional scru-
tiny of the constitutions of the southern states readmitted to the Union after the Civil War. See
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 2465 (1868) (remarks of Sen. Thaddeus Stevens); S. EXEC.
Doc. No. 40-57, 14-15 (1866); WIECEK, supra note 162.
178. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1072 (1866). Similarly, Representative Roswell
Hart of NewYork stated that the Guarantee Clause ensured that the states would recognize the
right to bear arms, freedom of religion, protections against unlawful search and seizure, and
due process. See id. at 1629.
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government."' 9 Senator Richard Yates of New York also thought that
the federal government could make the states observe certain fun-
damental rights under the Guarantee Clause:
I had in the simplicity of my heart supposed that "State rights," be-
ing the issue of the [civil] war, had been decided. I had supposed
that we had established the proposition that there is a living Fed-
eral Government and a Congress of the United States. I do not
mean a consolidated Government, but a central Federal Govern-
ment which, while it allows the States the exercise of all their ap-
propriate functions as local State governments, can hold the States
well poised in their appropriate spheres, can secure the enforce-
ment of the constitutional guarantees of republican government,
the rights and immunities of citizens in the several States, and carry
out all the objects provided for in the preamble of the Constitu-
tion.... "establish justice," and "secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and to our posterity."1s°
Therefore, members of Congress, whose views were representative of
nineteenth-century legal thinking, believed that there were certain
rights that were retained by the people in every state, leading to uni-
formity with respect to a core set of fundamental rights among the
people of the United States.
179. Id. at 1075.
180. Id. at app. 99. Michael Kent Curtis has noted that Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment was tied to the notion ofa "Republican Form of Government" in the press during
the ratification process. Curtis quotes from an editorial in the DubuqueDaily Timer.
[A citizen has] a right to claim the privileges and protection of law. The right to"life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" is surely his; and the principle of a republican
form of government cannot do less than secure to him those inherent rights which
nature gives. This is the intent of the second clause of the condemned section above
quoted. It prohibits any state from making laws to abridge the privileges rightly con-
ferred on every citizen by the federal constitution, which instrument, before, only ne-
glected to define who were entitled to the benefits conferred.
CURTis, supra note 3, at 132 (quoting DUBUQUE DAILYTIMES, Nov. 21, 1866, at 1). In addition,
Curtis quotes from a report of the Committee on Federal Relations of the Massachusetts House
of Representatives that ties § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to both the Privileges and Im-
munities and Guarantee Clauses of Article IV:
It is difficult to see how these provisions [in Section One] differ from those now exist-
ing in the Constitution. The preamble to the Constitution grandly and solemnly de-
dares: "WE, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, pro-
mote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."
Many of our ablest jurists agree with the opinion of the late Attorney-General
Bates, that all native-born inhabitants and naturalized aliens, without distinction of
color or sex, are citizens of the United States. The Constitution (Article IV, section 2)
declares, "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states."
Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican
form of government.
Id. at 150 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 149, at 1-4 (Mass. 1867)).
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Nineteenth-century commentators also agreed with these views.'8 '
For example, John Norton Pomeroy stated that in the United States,
"the individual is regarded as having surrendered a part of his purely
natural rights for the general welfare; and the amount of this conces-
sion is as small as possible; while the sum of those retained by him,
and recognized and enforced by the municipal law, is a maximum.
' 82
Similarly, Justice Story seemed to whole-heartedly support the posi-
tion that the states were restrained from violating the rights retained
by the people because of the nature of republican governments:
Whether, indeed, independently of the Constitution of the United
States, the nature of republican and free governments does not
necessarily impose some restraints upon the legislative power, has
been much discussed. It seems to be the general opinion, fortified
by a strong current of judicial opinion, that, since the American
revolution, no state government can be presumed to possess the
transcendental sovereignty to take away vested rights of property; to
take the property of A and transfer to B by a mere legislative act.
That government can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the
rights of property are left solely dependent upon a legislative body,
without any restraint. The fundamental maxims of a free govern-
ment seem to require, that the rights of personal liberty and private
property should be held sacred. At least, no court ofjustice in this
country would be warranted in assuming, that any State legislature
possessed a power to violate and disregard them; or that such a
power, so repugnant to the common principles of justice and civil
liberty, lurked under any general grant of legislative authority, or
ought to be implied from any general expression of the will of the
people, in the usual forms of the constitutional delegation of
power. The people ought not be presumed to part with rights so
vital to their security and well-being, without very strong and posi-
tive declarations to that effect.10
Justice Story thus recognized certain rights as existing prior to the es-
tablishment of both the state and federal governments. These rights
181. See, e.g., POMEROY, supra note 33, at 358; 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTI-
TITJON, supra note 139, at 261-62. Pomeroy summarized the relation of the people to the state
as follows:
The national law... sees the whole nation as a body politic, and the separate indi-
viduals composing it, and awards to the latter all those rights which are deemed com-
patible with the safety and prosperity of the whole. How general or how limited will
be this concession of privileges to the individual, will depend in great measure upon
the political organization, upon the ideas of social order, which underlie the govern-
ment. In our own country the theory is, that all power of government as a practical in-
stitution, is derived from the people themselves.
POMEROY, supra, at 358.
182. POMEROY, supra note 33, at 359.
183. See 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 261-62.
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he termed the "fundamental maxims of a free government."'"
This language is similar to that of Justice Bushrod Washington in
Corfield v. Coryel4,'8 who stated that there were certain rights pertain-
ing to citizens in all free governments, which were guaranteed under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.'T The fact that
the people had delegated to the government the power to regulate
their rights did not mean that the government was granted the power
to abridge these pre-existing rights of the people. Rather, textual pro-
visions such as those found in Article IV showed that the Framers of
the Constitution recognized these principles and provided for judi-
cial enforcement of the privileges of citizenship by embodying them
in the constitutional text.
The power of the federal government to enforce these rights of the
people against the state governments may have been delegated spe-
cifically in the Guarantee Clause. According to Justice Story:
The Federalist has spoken with so much force and propriety upon
this subject, that it supersedes all further reasoning. "In a confed-
eracy," says that work, "founded on republican principles, and
composed of republican members, the superintending government
ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aris-
tocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature
of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in
the political institutions of each other, and the greater right to in-
sist that the forms of government under which the compact was en-
tered into should be substantially maintained.
But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy
be deposited than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Gov-
ernments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less
adapted to a federal coalition of any sort than those of a kindred
nature."8 7
Justice Story concluded that "[t]he only restriction imposed on [the
states] is, that they shall not exchange republican for anti-republican
constitutions, a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be con-
sidered as a grievance." '
Therefore, it would appear that injustice Story's opinion the fed-
eral government possessed the power to intervene if the states estab-
lished governments that did not recognize these fundamental rights
184. Id. at 362.
185. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
186. See id. at 550-51 (discussing powers granted to the state and federal governments re-
lated to regulation of commerce).
187. 2 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 139, at 570-71 (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 21).
188. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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retained by the people. If they established new governments recog-
nizing these rights, then the federal government would have no
power to prevent such innovations. Indeed, if the states employed
novel or diverse means for regulating these privileges, the federal
government would have no grounds to intervene.
This interpretation of the Guarantee Clause lived on even after
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his analysis of Justice
Story's Commentaries, Thomas Cooley, a noted nineteenth-century
constitutional scholar, tied the Guarantee Clause to the Fourteenth
Amendment and noted that the privileges to be guaranteed under
the Fourteenth Amendment also existed anterior to the establish-
ment of government:
The existing division of sovereignty which had been found equal to
the preservation of our liberties, not only in times of peace and
general harmony but in the trials of a most desperate civil strife, is
not disturbed by [the Fourteenth Amendment]. It does, indeed,
prohibit the States from exercising certain powers upon their citi-
zens; but unless we are wholly mistaken in our assertion that they
are not powers which the people, in framing free republican gov-
ernments, are accustomed to intrust to their rulers, it will be per-
ceived that the provisions of this article are not to be regarded as
limitations upon power, but rather as precautions against possible
usurpation and tyranny. The things forbidden were already for-
bidden by the fundamental principles of the social compact, and
beyond the sphere of the legislative authority alike of the States
and of the nation.189
Therefore, even if the fundamental rights of citizenship were not af-
forded substantive protection against abridgment by state govern-
ments under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2, they may have been afforded such protection under the
Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4.'9' Although certain com-
mentators expressed this view during the nineteenth century, a lack
of consensus regarding this interpretation rendered ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment necessary.
The provisions of Article IV may be viewed as establishing a federal
system based upon a community of rights-a core set of rights that
could be regulated in different manners by the various state govern-
ments, but which the states were obligated to observe in some form.' 9'
189. Id. at 684.
190. See infra Part II1.C (discussing the nature of the protection afforded under the Four-
teenth Amendment).
191. See Smith, Analysis, supra note 146, at 272-78 (discussing the role of Article IV in estab-
lishing the federal structure under both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution).
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The federal government originally may have been intended to pos-
sess the power to arbitrate disputes concerning inequalities in these
rights through Article III and to ensure that all of the states observed
a core set of these rights, which they could regulate in different
manners. Perhaps the only function of Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment, therefore, was to clarify this interpretation of Ar-
ticle IV.
III. ARTICLE IV AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The preceding analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the
provisions of Article IV of the Constitution lays the foundation for an
understanding of the original meaning attributed to Section One of
the Fourteenth Amendment. An examination of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the Guarantee Clause leads to an explanation
of (1) the rights thought to be protected under the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment,
(2) the distinction made between civil and political rights by congres-
sional Republicans debating the proposed Amendment, (3) the type
of protection afforded under Section One, and (4) the belief on the
part of congressional Republicans that the states would remain free
to regulate the privileges and immunities of citizens in diverse man-
ners after ratification of the Amendment. The following subparts at-
tempt to resolve the controversy surrounding these issues.
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to guar-
antee certain natural or common-law privileges and immunities of
citizens.' 92 The guarantee did not extend to political privileges and
immunities such as the right to vote or to hold political office, but
rather encompassed privileges and immunities of citizens. Citizens
were to receive both substantive as well as antidiscrimination protec-
tion.'" They were to be guaranteed a closed set of privileges and
immunities as well as equal privileges and immunities-equality of
privileges and immunities as well as limited equality in the regulation
of these privileges and immunities by the state governments. 94 Fi-
192. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
193. See infra Part III.C (discussing the nature of the protection afforded under Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment).
194. Earl Maltz has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted to enforce a guar-
antee of "limited absolute equality." See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 4; Earl M. Maltz, The Fourteenth
Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO
ST. Lj. 933 (1984) [hereinafter Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment]; Earl M. Maltz, Reconstruction With-
out Revolution: Republican Civil Rights Theor in the Era of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 HOus. L.
REV. 221 (1987) [hereinafter Maltz, Republican Civil Rights). However, the equality intended
under the Amendment was not entirely "absolute" with respect to the regulations governing
the guaranteed privileges and immunities. "Unequal" regulations enacted pursuant to the
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nally, the state governments were to retain their power of regulation
of the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens under Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment. All of these beliefs on the
part of Republicans may be explained by appealing to concepts em-
bodied in the nineteenth-century understanding of Article IV.
A. Rights Protected Under Section One
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no
state shall abridge the "privileges" or "immunities" of citizens of the
United States.'9 As previously noted, these terms as used in Article
IV, Section 2 were thought to denote certain natural or common-law
rights of citizens.'9 Members of Congress agreed with this interpreta-
tion of the terms as used in Article IV and Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 97 Furthermore, the dissenting Justices in the
Slaughter-House Cases came to the same conclusion!" Given this con-
sensus, it is particularly surprising that the majority in the Slaughter-
House Cases construed the Privileges or Immunities Clause as guaran-
teeing only certain limited rights of national citizenship.'9
1. Members of Congress
Congressional Republicans spoke often of the rights they wished to
guarantee free blacks as being inherent, natural, or common-law
rights. For example, during the debates over the Civil Rights Act,
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois argued:
To be a citizen of the United States carries with it some rights; and
what are they? They are those inherent, fundamental rights which
belong to free citizens or free men in all countries, such as the
rights enumerated in this bill, and they belong to them in all the
States of the Union.m
Like Senator Trumbull, several members of Congress equated the
fundamental privileges and immunities protected under Article IV,
Section 2 with the rights of citizenship. For example, Representative
common good were contemplated under the Amendment.
195. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
196. See supra Part I (noting the belief that the privileges and immunities of citizenship re-
late to natural law rights outside the scope of government).
197. See infra Part IIIA1 (quoting members of the Senate and House during floor debates
regarding the proposed Fourteenth Amendment).
198. See infra Part IIA2 (examining the dissenting opinions of Justices Bradley and Field
and their assertion that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees certain com-
mon-law rights).
199. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing numerous critiques of the
Slaughter-House decision).
200. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866).
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Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania, in discussing the Civil Rights Bill,
stated:
The sole purpose of the bill is to secure to [blacks] the fundamen-
tal rights of citizenship; those rights which constitute the essence of
freedom, and which are common to the citizens of all civilized
States; those rights which secure life, liberty, and property, and
which make all men equal before the law.... 201
Finally, Senator Trumbull noted that the Bill provided that blacks
were to be considered citizens and that:
they will be entitled to the rights of citizens. And what are they?
The great fundamental rights set forth in this bill: the right to ac-
quire property, the right to go and come at pleasure, the right to
enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit and
dispose of property. These are the very nihts that are set forth in
this bill as appertaining to 
every freeman. t
Members of congress made similar statements in discussing the rights
guaranteed under the Thirteenth Amendment, which some believed
authorized passage of the Civil Rights Act.2 0 3 Thus, many Republicans
agreed that all citizens should be entitled to the enjoyment of certain
fundamental, common-law rights.
Moreover, members of Congress were aware of the theories of con-
temporary commentators who believed that there was a body of
common-law rights to which all citizens of the United States were en-
titled. AsJustice Story and Chancellor Kent wrote in their Commentar-
id"es and Representative Lawrence noted in debates over the Civil
Rights Act of 1866,2ta the colonists stated in the Declaration of Rights
of 1774 that "the inhabitants of the English colonies of North Amer-
201. Id. at 1152.
202. Id. at 475.
203. Set id. at 1780-81 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (stating that all citizens born in the
United States and not subject to foreign power are citizens); see also id. at 1833 (statement of
Rep. Lawrence) (distinguishing certain civil rights, which must be protected for all citizens
from political rights, which are left to the states); id. at 1255 (statement of Sen. Wilson)
(characterizing the right to life, property, and liberty as being distinct from the right to partici-
pate in government); id. at 1151-52 (statement of Rep. Thayer); id. at 1124 (statement of Rep.
Cook) (declaring that Congress has power to pass legislation enforcing Thirteenth Amend-
ment); id. at 1118 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (calling on government to protect fundamental
rights belonging to all men); id. at 602, 741 (statement of Sen. Lane) (asserting that former
slaves are free, and that freedom encompasses all the rights, privileges and immunities of free-
men); id. at 570 (statement of Sen. Morrill) (contending that all native born individuals are
citizens); id. at 50-04 (statement of Sen. Howard) (arguing that narrow construction of the
Thirteenth Amendment was against congressional intent); id. at app. 102 (statement of Sen.
Yates) (arguing that there was no intent by Framers to exclude any race when declaring all men
equal).
204. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (discussing commentators' view that
American common law derived from the English common law).
205. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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ica, by the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the English
constitution, and the several charters or compacts [were entitled to
certain rights such as] life, liberty, and property."2 Lawrence con-
cluded that Congress had the power to provide for enforcement of
these rights:
I maintain that Congress may by law secure the citizens of the na-
tion in the enjoyment of their inherent right of life, liberty, and
property, and the means essential to that end, by penal enactments
to enforce the observance of the provisions of the Constitution, ar-
ticle four, section, two, and the equal civil rights which it recognizes
or by implication affinns to exist among citizens of the same
State."'
Thus, members of Congress adopted the theory that citizens of the
United States inherited certain common-law rights from England and
that these rights were intended to be guaranteed under Article IV of
the Constitution. These "inherent" rights are wholly analogous to
those natural law rights that formed the constituent elements of an
American "common law"-an American jus gentium--rights that were
guaranteed in all free governments.2 The terms "privileges" and
"immunities" used in Article IV to denote these common-law rights
were thought to refer only to fundamental privileges and immunities
of citizens in all free governments, and not special privileges or im-
munities2l
206. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832-33 (1866). Lawrence stated:
[T] here are certain absolute rights which pertain to every citizen, which are inherent,
and of which a State cannot constitutionally deprive him. But not only are these rights
inherent and indestructible, but the means whereby they may be possessed and en-
joyed are equally so.
Every citizen, therefore, has the absolute right to live, the right of personal security,
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property. These are rights of citi-
zenship. As necessary incidents of these absolute rights, there are others, as the right
to make and enforce contracts, to purchase, hold, and enjoy property, and to share
the benefit of laws for the security of person and property.
Id. at 1833.
207. Id. at 1835.
208. See supra Part I.B (analogizing the common law to the jus gentium and noting that
American common law was the source of fundamental privileges and immunities).
209. The notion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment only guaranteed certain "fundamental" privileges and immunities of citi-
zenship is not a new idea, and is widely supported by statements made by members of Congress
during the debates over the Amendment. Raoul Berger, for example, has concluded that the
historical evidence indicates
that the "fundamental" rights which the framers were anxious to secure were those
described by Blackstone-personal security, freedom to move about and to own
property; they had been picked up in the privileges and immunities of Article IV, Sec-
tion 2; the incidental rights necessary for their protection were "enumerated" in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866; that enumeration, according to the framers, marked the
bounds of the grant; and at length those rights were embodied in the "privileges or
398
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2. The Slaughter-House Cases
Several member of the Supreme Court deciding the Slaughter-House
Cases also thought that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to guarantee certain common-law rights. The Slaughter-
House dissenters referred to the Lockean triumvirate of life, liberty,
and property as embodied in the Declaration of Independence as
comprising the fundamental rights of citizens "of every free govern-
ment." Justice Bradley stated in his dissent:
Here again we have the great threefold division of the rights of
freemen, asserted as the rights of man. Rights to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness are equivalent to the rights of life, liberty,
and property. These are the fundamental rights which can only be
taken away by due process of law, and which can only be ... modi-
fied, by lawful regulations necessary or proper for the mutual good
of all; and these rights, I contend, belong to the citizens of every
free government.
210
Thus, Justice Bradley reiterated Justice Washington's comments in
CGoteld that the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens
were those to which citizens of all free governments were entitled
and that these were the privileges and immunities referred to in Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment.21' Justice Field made simi-
lar remarks in his Slaughter-House dissent, stating that "[t] he privileges
and immunities designated [in Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment] are those which of right belong to the citizens of all free gov-
ernments.'212 Thus, the "privileges or immunities of citizens" referred
to in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV, Sec-
tion 2 were those privileges and immunities that were fundamental-
that existed anterior to the formation of government, whether be-
longing equally to all men or flowing from the social compact among
the members of society, its citizens.15
immunities" of the Fourteenth Amendment.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BYJUDICIARY, supra note 22, at 20-22. By developing a definition of the
term "fundamental" and distinguishing fundamental from special privileges and immunities,
one may determine what exactly the Privileges or Immunities Clause was designed to protect,
instead of merely looking for particular exemplars of what were deemed "fundamental" privi-
leges and immunities of citizenship at the time of ratification of the Amendment. See Smith,
Citizenship, supra note 11, at 717, 734 (discussing the nature of the fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizenship); Smith, Privieges, supra note 23, at 881-85 (same).
210. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 116 (BradleyJ, dissenting).
211. See id. at 117 (quoting Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230)).
212. Id. at 97 (FieldJ, dissenting).
213. This was the conclusion of the first court to hear a case arising under the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In United States v. Hall, the federal court
stated: "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States here referred
to? They are undoubtedly those which may be denominated fundamental; which belong of
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Modem commentators have noted that many of the rights enu-
merated in the Civil Rights Act, a precursor of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were common-law rights such as the rights
of property, contract, and security of person."4 The statements made
by Republicans in Congress as well as the views of the dissenting Jus-
tices in the Slaughter-House Cases indicate that the rights they identi-
fied as being guaranteed under Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment were the same as those that were common-law rights of
citizens in both England and America. There was a consensus that
these were rights enjoyed by citizens in all free governments, rights
that were inherent in a republican form of government. The analysis
in Parts I and II of this Article explains the nineteenth-century belief
that the Fourteenth Amendment was thought to provide a national
guarantee for such common-law rights. These were the same rights
that were thought to be guaranteed under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of Article IV, Section 2,215 and they were arguably the
same rights that were inherent in a "Republican Form of Govern-
ment. ,2 6  Given Republicans' choice of the terms "privileges" and
"immunities" in Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, these
statements concerning the rights to be guaranteed under the
Amendment should come as no surprise. The choice of language
was perfectly natural, and for those who were familiar with the un-
derstanding of these terms in the nineteenth-century legal commu-
nity, the language is clear and relatively unambiguous.
right to the citizens of all free states... which compose this Union from the time of their be-
coming free, independent and sovereign." 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282)
(quoting Corfied, 6 F. Cas. 546,551).
214. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 4, at 994-95. By implication, these were the types of
rights that constituted the "privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States." As Pro-
fessor McConnell has noted:
The 1866 [Civil Rights] Act protected black citizens in their enjoyment of numerous
rights derived from state law, including the right to make and enforce contracts, to
acquire, hold, and dispose of property, and to testify in court. IfSlaughter-Houseis cor-
rect, then these rights were not privileges or immunities of citizens-a position impos-
sible to square with the legislative history of the Amendment.
Id. at 999; see alsoAmar, supra note 171, at 1230 (noting that Senator Lyman Trumball and Rep-
resentative James Wilson used "broad common law and natural rights language" in support of
the Civil Rights Act); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Re-
vising the Slaughter-House Cases Without ExhumingLochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1, 50 (1996) (noting that the language of the Civil Rights Act can be
construed to extend to common-law rights).
215. See supra Part I.B (contending that case law, legal scholars and Supreme Court Justices
supported the idea that the Clause guaranteed certain common rights).
216. See supra Part 1H (discussing whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects citi-
zens against state government action).
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B. The Distinction Between Civil and Political Privileges and Immunities
It is widely recognized that political rights, such as the right to vote
and to serve on juries, were not intended to be guaranteed under the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 As
I have argued elsewhere,18 such rights could not be fundamental privi-
leges and immunities of citizens because they could exist only after
establishment of the government. The same is true in general of all
such special privileges. The distinction between political and civil
rights was well-established in nineteenth-century legal thought. Chief
Justice Taney made such a distinction in his opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, where he stated that "[u]ndoubtedly, a person may be a
citizen, that is, a member of the community who form the sover-
eignty, although he exercises no share of the political power, and is
incapacitated from holding particular offices."219 Moreover, this con-
clusion is supported by the text of the Amendment, which guarantees
privileges and immunities of citizens, and not political rights.M
Members of Congress responsible for drafting the Amendment
noted that it was well established under the case law of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 that the phrase
"Privileges and Immunities of Citizens" did not refer to political
rights, but merely extended civil rights to foreign citizens. In support
of this proposition, Representative William Lawrence of Ohio stated
that the privileges referred to under Article IV were "such as are fun-
damental civil rights, not political rights, nor those dependent upon
local law.... "2' The fact that Representative Lawrence identified
political rights with rights "dependent upon local law" indicates that
political rights were thought to be wholly analogous to municipal
217. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 29 (distinguishing political rights from those guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Timothy S. Bishop, Comment, The Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 79 NW. U. L. REv. 142, 145 (1984);see also
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (according to SenatorJacob Howard of Michi-
gan, "It]he right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities ... secured by
the Constitution").
218. See Smith, Privileges, supra note 23, at 873-81 (discussing the distinction between fun-
damental and special privileges and immunities under Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
219. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 422. Justice Benjamin K Curtis made the same distinction in his
dissent. See id. at 581 (Curtis, J., dissenting). However, complicating the analysis concerning
rights addressed under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was the fact that the phrase
"political rights" was sometimes used as a synonym for "civil rights." The original version of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment secured "to all citizens.., the same political rights
and privileges." NELSON, supra note 152, at 51-52 (suggesting that the "political rights" lan-
guage was dropped because it might be construed as guaranteeing to free blacks political rights
such as the right to vote, hold office, serve on juries, and serve in the militia); see also Maltz,
Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 194, at 965.
220. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
221. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1836 (1866).
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regulations governing the exercise of the fundamental privileges and
immunities of the citizenry2m Neither were afforded protection un-
der Article IV, Section 2, and neither were intended to be afforded
protection under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1. The Civil Rights Bill
During the debates over the proposed Civil Rights Bill, a precursor
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, Senate and House
Republicans proclaimed that political rights would not be guaranteed
under the Bill. After reading the passage from Corfield v. Coyell,
which enumerated the fundamental privileges and immunities of
citizens under Article IV, Senator Trumbull argued that the Civil
Rights Bill did not provide for the elective franchise.s4
As Representative Martin Thayer of Pennsylvania noted, the words
in the Civil Rights Bill were "civil rights and immunities," not political
privileges.2m He proposed that "no lawyer who is acquainted with the
use of terms and the rules which regulate the construction of laws"
could interpret the Bill to extend the suffrage laws.2m Representative
Thayer gave the following analysis of the language of the Bill:
In the first place, the words themselves are "civil rights and im-
munities," not political privileges; and nobody can successfully con-
tend that a bill guaranteeing simply civil rights and immunities is a
bill under which you could extend the right of suffrage, which is a
political privilege and not a civil right.
Then, again, the matter is put beyond all doubt by the subse-
quent particular definition of the general language which has been
just used; and when those civil rights which are first referred to in
general terms in the bill are subsequently enumerated, that enu-
meration precludes any possibility that the general words which
have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which have
been enumerated.m
Similarly, Representative James Wilson of Iowa cited the definition
of civil rights in Bouvier's Law Dictionary as "those [rights] which have
222. See infra Part III.D (discussing the states' retained power of regulation under Section
One of Fourteenth Amendment).
223. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,320).
224. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 475-77 (1866). Several members of Congress la-
mented the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act did not confer the elec-
tive franchise. Senator Samuel Pomeroy stated that without suffrage, free blacks would have
"no security," id. at 1182, and Senator Sumner posited that if the Amendment"is inadequate to
protect persons in their... right to vote, it is inadequate to protect themin anything." CONG.
GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869).
225. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., lstSess. 1151 (1866).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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no relation to the establishment, support, or management of gov-
ernment."m8 Moreover, years later a separate amendment, the Fif-
teenth Amendment, was enacted which explicitly guaranteed free
blacks the political right to vote.2 Thus, later congressional action
further supports contemporaneous congressional statements indicat-
ing that the privileges and immunities of citizens did not include po-
litical privileges.
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
The distinction between civil and political privileges that the Re-
publicans made during the debates over the proposed Civil Rights
Bill carried over to the debates concerning the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment. During the Amendment debates, several members of
Congress indicated that it was not their intention to confer political
privileges under Section One. For example, many Republicans
noted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not confer the right to
vote upon free blacks.' As Senator Trumbull stated, "the granting of
228. Id. at 1117; see also id. at 1367 (statement of Rep. Wilson) (explaining that some House
members were concerned that courts may interpret civil rights to include suffrage); see also id.
at 1757 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (maintaining that the right to vote is determined by state
legislation); id. at 1263 (statement of Rep. Broomall) (arguing that suffrage can only be in-
tended by specific legislation). There was some confusion in terminology, however, in that
some members of Congress thought that the phrase "civil rights" might encompass political
rights as well. Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, for example, was disturbed that the
phrase "civil rights and immunities" in the Bill was a "generic term which in its most compre-
hensive signification includes every species of right that man can enjoy other than [natural
rights)" and that "[t]he right to vote.., is a civilright." Id. at 477; see also id. at 1291 (statement
of Rep. Bingham) (arguing that political rights are a subset of civil rights); id. at 1157
(statement of Rep. Thornton) (noting that in numerous dictionaries, civil is synonymous with
political); id. at 476 (statement of Sen. McDougail) (asking for clarification that political rights
are not considered civil rights and Trumbull responding that they are separate and distinct).
229. U.S. CONSr. amend. XV, § 1. ("The right of citizens to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."). During the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment, it was noted that the Four-
teenth Amendment did not confer the right to vote. According to Senator Cragin:
I remember the struggle that we had here in the passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment; ... I remember that it was announced upon this floor by more than one gen-
teman .... that that amendment did not confer the right of voting upon anybody....
There is no doubt upon the question. It was the understanding of Congress and of
the people of this country that that amendment did not confer and did not seek to
confer any right to vote upon any citizen of the United States ..... [T]hat it conferred
the right to vote was distinctly disclaimed on this floor in the caucus which has been
alluded to here to-night; and, for one, I am not willing to have it go out from this Sen-
ate that we passed that amendment understanding that it conferred any right to vote.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003-04 (1869).
230. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539-40 (1866) (statement of Rep. Farnsworth)
(stating his support for the proposed Amendment but noting that it did not go far enough); id.
at 2462 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (noting his regret that right to vote for blacks had not
been written into Constitution); id. at 406-07 (statement of Rep. Eliot) (objecting to states'
right to disenfranchise men of a given race); id. at 405 (statement of Rep. Shellabarger)
(lamenting that whole races remain disenfranchised). Representative Wilson stated that suf-
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civil rights does not... carry with it... political privileges. A man
may be a citizen in this country without a right to vote .... The right
to vote ... depends upon the legislation of the various States."" '
Senator Howard added:
[T] he first section of the proposed amendment does not give to ei-
ther of these classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is
not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the
Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been
regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not re-
garded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all
society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves,
subject to a depotism.
2s
Representative Bingham reiterated this position in the context of de-
bates over the propsed Fourteenth Amendment. Upon introducing
the Amendment on the floor of the House, Bingham stated that "the
exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges
of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the
States."2 He further noted that "[i] t is a guarantied [sic] right of
every State in this Union to regulate for itself the elective franchise
within its limits, subject to no condition whatever except that it shall
not... transform the State government from one republican in
form." ' Thus, there was a consistent recognition that the privileges
frage was "a political right which has been left under the control of the several States, subject to
the action of Congress only when it becomes necessary to enforce the guarantee of a republi-
can form of government." Id. at 1117.
231. Id. at 1757.
232. Id. at 2766; see also Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 194, at 942 (detailing the
bitter debate in Congress over granting suffrage to blacks).
233. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). This was not the only time that Rep-
resentative Bingham made a distinction between political and civil lights. In the debate over
admission of Oregon as a state, Bingham distinguished political rights, which he indicated were
conventional, from natural or inherent lights. According to Bingham, the"distincive" political
rights of citizens of the United States included:
The great right to choose (under the laws of the States) severally, as I remarked be-
fore, either directly by ballot or indirectly through their duly-constituted agents, all
the officers of the Federal Government, legislative, executive, and judicial, and
through these to make all constitutional laws for their own government, and to inter-
pret and enforce them; the right, also, to hold and exercise, upon election thereto,
the several offices of honor, of power, and of trust, under the Constitution and Gov-
ernment of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859). Representative Bingham continued, noting
that "[t] his Government rests upon the absolute equality of natural rights amongst men. There
is not, and cannot be, any equality in the enjoyment of political or conventional rights, because
that is impossible." Id. at 985. Representative Bingham further stated that "[p]olitical rights
are conventional, not natural; limited, not universal; and are, in fact, exercised only by the ma-
jority of the qualified electors of any State and by the minority only nominally." Id.
234. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 450 (1867). Similarly, Senator Howard stated that
Section One of the Amendment did "not give to either of these classes [whites or blacks] the
right of voting." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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of citizenship did not encompass political privileges.
The views of Republicans debating the Civil Rights Bill and the
proposed Fourteenth Amendment can be explained by appealing to
the theories underlying the provisions of Article IV that influenced
the drafting of the Amendment. As previously noted, special privi-
leges were not guaranteed under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, Section 2.25 Special privileges were localized.
They were not privileges and immunities of citizens in all free gov-
ernments, and not part of a jus gentium composed of those funda-
mental rights shared by substantially all of the states in the federal
system. The privileges and immunities of citizens were those com-
mon-law rights that were guaranteed in the vast majority of the states
and which were embodied in the state constitutions. Political privi-
leges, such as the right to vote or to hold office, were special privi-
leges. Indeed, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 did not give citizens a right to travel to foreign states to
vote. Such political privileges were not fundamental privileges and
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under the Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, or under Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
C. The Type of Protection Afforded Under Section One
As previously noted, there are two possible interpretations of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2: (1) that it
guaranteed substantive protection for a uniform set of fundamental
privileges, or (2) that it guaranteed merely equal privileges and im-
munities of citizens. Even if the latter interpretation is correct, it
may have been assumed that there was a core set of fundamental
privileges and immunities of citizens that would be respected by all
free governments and that, therefore, there would be in practice uni-
formity in the privileges and immunities of citizens throughout the
United States. This uniformity may not have been mandated under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but rather may have been a re-
sult of the similarity in the constitutions of the various states, which
guaranteed in essence the same core set of fundamental rights of citi-
zens. The privileges and immunities of citizens guaranteed under
Article IV may have been conceived of as being elements of ajus gen-
tiurm, or American common law, consisting of those fundamental
rights that were shared in common among virtually every state in the
285. See supra notes 116, 209 and accompanying text.
286. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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federal system. Whether this common law was federalized through
embodiment in the positive textual provisions of the Constitution is a
point that has been debated.
Even if one concludes that the antidiscrimination reading of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 is the most
historically accurate, it does not mean that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
tended to afford only antidiscrimination protection to citizens. "
The Privileges or Immunities Clause may also have been intended to
remedy perceived defects in Article IV and to afford substantive pro-
tection as well. m It may have been the framers' intent to mandate
that the states uniformly respect certain fundamental rights of citi-
zens, such that the states could not withdraw these rights without vio-
lating the prohibitions in Section One, even if the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 guaranteed only antidis-
crimination protection. This may have been the reason that the
phrase "privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" was
used in Section One-to indicate that certain fundamental rights
that all state governments must recognize were inherent in one's
status as a citizen of the United States.29 The states might still be free to
regulate in diverse manners the form in which these capacities of
citizenship existed or the mode in which they could be exercised, but
were under an obligation to recognize these pre-political privileges
and immunities of citizens in some form.
Antidiscrimination protection under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may have been at the level of
regulation of the privileges and immunities of citizens. The Clause
may have guaranteed substantive as well as antidiscrimination protec-
tion in terms of the fundamental privileges and immunities that citi-
zens were entitled to enjoy in all of the states, as well as the privilege or
immunity of being subject only to equal regulation of these fundamen-
tal privileges and immunities. Thus, one of the privileges and im-
munities of citizens was enjoyment of equal civil rights. Not only is
this interpretation of Section One as protecting only fundamental
privileges and immunities of citizens consistent with the original
237. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 1451-54 (presenting the case for interpreting the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment as embodying an
equality-based directive).
238. See, e.g., Fairman, supra note 12, at 77 (concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment
.meant to establish some substantial rights" under the heading "'privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States'"); see also Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE LJ. 57, 73 (1993) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to enforce existing substantive rights rather than establish new ones).
239. See Smith, Citizenship, supra note 11, at 683-85.
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meaning of the Amendment, but this was also the interpretation
adopted by the Supreme Court dissenters in the Slaughter-House
Cases.
2 40
The above analysis of the intellectual background of the provisions
found in Article IV supports the substantive interpretation of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If
the "privileges" and "immunities" of citizens were the fundamental
common-law rights recognized in all free governments, then by ratify-
ing Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment the people of the
United States must have intended to guarantee that no state could
withhold these fundamental rights. These were the rights that consti-
tuted a "Republican Form of Government," and every state must rec-
ognize such rights. This substantive guarantee would not tread upon
the states' retained power to regulate the fundamental rights of the
citizenry because the guarantee was relatively abstract. States could
not prohibit citizens from exercising their right to enter into con-
tracts, but they might pass different regulations governing the forma-
tion of contracts. States could not prohibit citizens from bringing
suits against others, but they might pass different statutes of limita-
tions. The substantive guarantee was not intended to mandate a cer-
tain set of regulations accompanying these fundamental rights. Sec-
tion One for instance did not mandate any particular length for a
statute of limitations, or that a state pass any statute of limitations at
all.
D. Regulation of the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
In the nineteenth-century mind, there was a well-defined notion of
the legitimate sphere of government action in regulating the funda-
mental rights of the citizenry, which was not meant to be disturbed by
the Fourteenth Amendment.241 In his Commentaries, Chancellor Kent
240. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 116 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the notion that privileges and immunities only attach to state citizenship, and not to
United States citizenship).
241. The Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged the state's right of regulation as pre-
served under the Fourteenth Amendment in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). The Court
stated that individuals, upon entering society, conferred upon the government the power to
regulate "the conduct of its citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall
use his own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Id. at 124-
26. Justice Field, one of the Slaughter-House dissenters, recognized this broad police power in
his dissent in Munn, maintaining that states possessed the power to"control the use and posses-
sion of [the citizen's] property, so far as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of
others, and to secure them the equal use and enjoyment of their property." Id. at 145. Justice
Field continued, stating.
It is true that the legislation which secures to all protection in their rights, and the
equal use and enjoyment of their property, embraces an almost infinite variety of sub-
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discussed the general power of the government to regulate property
rights in order to protect the rights of all the citizens when they come
into conflict. Indeed, Kent emphasized the necessity of endowing
government with such power:
But though property be thus protected, it is still to be understood
that the lawgiver has a fight to prescribe the mode and manner of
using it, so far as may be necessary to prevent the abuse of the
right, to the injury or annoyance of others, or of the public. The
government may, by general regulations, interdict such uses of
property as would create nuisances, and become dangerous to the
lives, or health, or peace, or comfort of the citizens. Unwholesome
trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the senses, the de-
jects. Whatever affects the peace, good order, morals, and health of the community
comes within its scope .... Indeed, there is no end of regulations with respect to the
use of property which may not be legitimately prescribed, having for their object the
peace, good order, safety, and health of the community, thus securing to all the equal
enjoyment of their property .....
Id. at 145-46. Justice Field later expounded upon these views in Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U.S. 27
(1885), in which he stated that the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
undoubtedly intended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or
liberty, or arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security
should be given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal
and civil rights; that all persons should be equally entitled to pursue their happiness
and acquire and enjoy property; that they should have like access to the courts of the
country for the protection of their persons and property, the prevention and redress
of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that no impediment should be inter-
posed to the pursuits of any one except as applied to the same pursuits by others un-
der like circumstances; that no greater burdens should be laid upon one than are laid
upon others in the same calling and condition, and that in the administration of
criminal justice no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than
such as is prescribed to all for like offences.
Id. at 31. The difference between an arbitrary deprivation of fundamental rights and a proper
exercise of the state's police power is the difference between an abridgement of the privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States and a proper regulation of the exercise of these
rights. Justice Field recognized this distinction:
[T]he amendment-broad and comprehensive as it is... was [not] designed to inter-
fere with the power of the State, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the
people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its re-
sources, and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities of society, leg-
islation of a special character, having these objects in view, must often be had in cer-
tain districts, such as for draining marshes and irrigating ard plains. Special burdens
are often necessary for general benefits-for supplying water, preventing fires, light-
ing districts, cleaning streets, opening parks, and many other objects. Regulations for
these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but
they are designed, not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one,
but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good.
Though, in many respects, necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish
just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under
the same circumstances and conditions. Class legislation, discriminating against some
and favoring others, is prohibited, but legislation which, in carrying out a public pur-
pose, is limited in its application, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all
persons similarly situated, is not within the amendment.
Id. at 31-32.
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posit of powder, the application of steampower to propel cars, the
building with combustible materials, and the burial of the dead,
may all be interdicted by law, in the midst of dense masses of popu-
lation, on the general and rational principle, that every person
ought so to use his property as not to injure his neighbors, and that
private interests must be made subservient to the general interests
of the community.
242
Thus, the proper role of the state governments in regulating the fun-
damental rights of the citizenry was well-settled when the people of
the United States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. This under-
standing of the role of government in regulating fundamental rights
is reflected in both the statements of members of Congress and
members of the Supreme Court interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases.
1. Members of Congress
During the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, several
members of Congress expressed the notion that the state govern-
ments should retain the power to regulate the privileges and immu-
nities of their citizens.2 It was thought that the states should remain
free to regulate the fundamental privileges and immunities of citi-
zens even after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. They were
to remain free to pass laws, for example, regulating criminal and civil
conduct without investing in Congress the power to prescribe uni-
form criminal or civil codes for all of the states.2 On many occa-
242. 2 KENT, supranote 54, at 441.
243. Several commentators have noted the importance of maintaining the federal system
and state sovereignty in the eyes of members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, which approved the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 5, at 49-50
(exploring the divergence between Northern and Southern views concerning states' rights as
reflected in congressional debate over the Fourteenth Amendment); Kaczorowski, supra note
23, at 572-73 ("Although the states could no longer deprive citizens of these rights, the framers
[of the Civil Rights Act] intended that the states retain their authority to regulate the exercise
and enjoyment of civil rights."). Raoul Berger, for example, quotes Horace Flack's The Adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment to support his interpretation of the Amendment under which the
states would retain significant power to regulate the fundamental rights of citizens: "Ihe
'radical leaders,' Horace Flack wrote, 'were as aware as any one of the attachment of a great
majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights... the right of the States to regulate
their own internal affairs.'" BERGER, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 5, at 50 (alteration
in original) (quoting FLACK, supra note 12, at 68). In Berger's opinion, "[o]ne of [Michael
Kent] Curtis' major flaws is his refusal to face up to Bingham's repeated recognition that con-
trol of internal matters was left to the States." Id. at 131; see also Maltz, Reconstruction, supra note
24, at 230 (submitting that the concept of federalism was influential in limiting Republican ef-
forts on behalf of freedmen).
244. Representative Bingham objected to the original version of the Civil Rights Bill, pro-
testing that since the term "civil rights" embraced all rights, the Fourteenth Amendment would
strike down every state constitution that made distinctions on the basis of race and color. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1414 (1866) (statement of Sen. Davis) ("The principles in-
volved in this bill, if they are legitimate and constitutional, would authorize Congress to pass
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sions, Republicans forcefully demonstrated their intent that the states
retain their power of regulation and that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment not mandate a uniform civil or criminal code for the states
24
civil and criminal codes for every State of the Union."); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
1291 (1866) (statement of Rep. Shellabarger) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment would
effectively "reform the whole criminal and civil Code of every State government"). The distinc-
tion between the phrases "civil rights" and "privileges and immunities" is therefore evident. As
Raoul Berger has noted, these phrases were not synonymous or used interchangeably. See
Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: AkhilAmar's Wishing Well, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 27-
28 (1993) (emphasizing that "privileges and immunities" was used instead of "civil rights" be-
cause "privileges and immunities" had a more limited meaning).
An explanation for the distinction may be found in the theory presented in this Article. The
phrase "civil rights" could be construed as referring to the positive regulations or modes in
which the privileges and immunities of citizenship were exercised. Mandating an equality of
civil rights would indeed reform the civil and criminal codes of the states and call for a uni-
formity in legislation among the states. The phrase "privileges and immunities," however,
could be construed as referring only to those capacities of citizenship existing anterior to the
establishment of the government that are regulated through municipal laws passed by legisla-
tures.
245. See CURTIS, supra note 3, at 68-69. Curtis notes in particular the objections of Repre-
sentative Robert S. Hale of New York, id. at 69 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-
65 (1866)), and Representative Giles W. Hotchkiss, id. at 71 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1095 (1866)). Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky contended that the Civil Rights Act
might authorize Congress to "pass a civil and criminal code for every State in the Union."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1414 (1866). Senator Willard Saulsbury argued that the Act
placed limitations on the "police power" of the states. See id. at 478. Representative AndrewJ.
Rogers indicated that Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment would "interfere with the
internal police and regulations of the States." Id. at app. 134. Senator Edgar Cowan, playing
devil's advocate, argued that the mandate for equality in regulation under the Civil Rights Act:
confers upon married women, upon minors, upon idiots, upon lunatics, and upon
everybody native born in all the States, the right to make and enforce contracts, be-
cause there is no qualification in the bill, and the very object of the bill is to override
the qualifications that are upon those rights in the States.
Id. at 1782. Representative Wilson added during the debate over the Civil Rights Bill that
"[wIe are not making a general criminal code for the States." Id. at 1120. Wilson also stated
that "the rights" of individuals "possesse[d] as a citizen of the United States" could "only be se-
cured to him by laws which operate within the State in which he resides." Id. at 2513. Repre-
sentative Thomas Davis of New York, in debates over the Civil Rights Act, argued that "this
Government is one of delegated powers, and.., every law.., is circumscribed by the limitation
of the Constitution. The States have reserved all sovereignty and power which has not been
expressly or impliedly granted to the Federal Government." Id. at 1265-66. Representative
Samuel Shellabarger posited that the Civil Rights Bill's "whole effect is not to confer or regu-
late rights, but to require that whatever of these enumerated rights and obligations are im-
posed by State laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinction based on race or
former condition in slavery." Id. at 1293. Finally, Columbus Delano, a Republican Representa-
tive from Ohio, worried that under the Civil Rights Bill, "Congress has authority to go into the
States and manage and legislate with regard to all the personal rights of the citizen-rights of
life, liberty, and property. You render this Government no longer a Government of limited
powers...." Id. at app. 158; see also HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE IMPERFECr UNION: THE
IMPACT OF THE CIVIt. WAR AND RECONSrRUCTION ON THE CONSTITUTION 438-40 (1973)
(highlighting Republicans' concerns regarding how the Fourteenth Amendment would impact
separation of powers, federalism, and civil liberties); NELSON, supra note 152, at 114-15
(discussing Republicans' fear that the Fourteenth Amendment would confer upon Congress
the power to reverse state common law); Maltz, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 194, at 936
(stating that "the concept of federalism was one overarching concern"); Maltz, Rconstruction,
supra note 24, at 230-36 (discussing Republicans' concern that the Fourteenth Amendment
would unduly expand congressional authority over basic rights).
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For example, Representative Bingham, the principal draftsman of
Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, commented that "[t]he
Constitution does not delegate to the United States the power to
punish offenses against the life, liberty, or property of the citizen in
the States.... but leaves it as the reserved power of the States, to be
by them exercised." 46 Bingham distinguished between fundamental
rights and their instantiation in municipal law. He argued that
"[t]he rights of life and liberty are theirs whatever States may enact,"
but also noted,
[W]ho ever heard it intimated that any body could have property
protected in any State until he owned or acquired property there
according to its local law... I undertake to say no one. As to real
estate, every one knows that its acquisition and transmission under
every interpretation ever given to the word property, as used in the
Constitution of the country, are dependent exclusively upon the
local law of the States.... But suppose any person has acquired
property not contrary to the laws of the State, but in accordance
with its law, are they not to be equally protected in the enjoyment
of it, or are they to be denied all protection?2
47
Representative Bingham concluded that the states should remain
free to regulate these fundamental privileges of citizenship:
[T] he care of the property, the liberty, and the life of the citizen,
under the solemn sanction of an oath imposed by your Federal
Constitution, is in the States, and not in the Federal Government.
I have sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitu-
tion of the country. I have advocated here an amendment which
would arm Congress with the power to compel obedience to the
oath, and punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights,
but leaving those officers to discharge the duties enjoined upon
them as citizens of the United States by that oath and by the Con-
218stitution.
246. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291 (1866). Representative Bingham also stated
that "the citizens must rely upon the State for their protection. I admit that such is the rule as it
now stands." Id. at 1093. Representative Bingham cited The Federalist No. 45: "The power re-
served to the Federal States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs
concerns the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improve-
ment, and prosperity of the State." Id. (quoting THE FEDERALISr NO. 45 (James Madison)).
247. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866). Democratic Representative Andrew
J. Rogers of New Jersey made a similar distinction between natural rights, rights "which God
gives us," and civil rights, which are "derived from the Government and municipal law, as laid
down in the organism of a State, and to extend to such persons as it may see fit." Id. at 1122.
248. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866);see also id. at 2542 (statement of Rep.
Bingham) (noting that "this amendment takes from no State any right that ever pertained to
it"); id. at 1090 (statement of Rep. Bingham) (asserting that adoption of the proposed amend-
ment would not deprive states of any rights); id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Bingham); Fairman,
supra note 12, at 33 (exploring Bingham's position that the Fourteenth Amendment merely
gave Congress the power to enforce the Bill of Rights); Gingras, supra note 4, at 44-45
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Other Republicans also acknowledged the states' retained power of
regulation.249 Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont, for example,
made a distinction between the regulation of a right and its destruction
or abridgment. "Every lawyer," Edmunds stated, "knows... that it is
one thing to have a right which is absolute and inalienable, and it is
another thing for the body of the community to regulate... the ex-
ercise of that right."2 Edmunds elaborated:
I may be daily deprived of my liberty under the regulations of the
State, which apply to us all alike. If I am deprived of it, rightfully or
wrongfully, I can only get restored to it by the process of the law
under the regulations that legislation shall provide. My friend ad-
mits that one of the privileges of a citizen of the United States is to
hold property. Where is he to hold it? He must hold it in some
State or Territory, must he not? Now, then, is he to acquire it in
spite of the State law by an instrument unwitnessed, unsealed, un-
signed? By no means. He must conform to the regulation of the
local law which declares that his deed must be witnessed by two
witnesses, must be sealed, must be acknowledged, must be deliv-
(discussing Bingham's views).
249. Representative Shellabarger indicated that the state governments could exercise the
right to regulate the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens without abridging
them:
Now, the inquiry I wish to make is this: suppose that at the time of taking a statutory
apprentice, or at the time of the birth of a child, the age of majority for the child and
the expiration of the apprenticeship is fixed by the law of this District, or of any of the
States, at the age of twenty-one years; and suppose the State, or the Legislature of this
District, in the exercise of municipal legislation, should change the law so as to termi-
nate the minority and the apprenticeship at eighteen instead of at twenty-one years,
and thus should take from the parent and from the master three years of service,
would that be depriving the citizen of property without due process of law, within the
meaning of Magna Carta or of the Constitution of the United States? Is not the prop-
erty in these personal relations within the full control of the municipal legislation of
every supreme legislature?
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636 (1862). Similarly, Senator Richard Yates of Illinois
also distinguished between regulating the rights of citizens and destroying them. According to
SenatorYates:
To define the length of residence necessary to enable a man to vote, to say what his
age shall be, is one thing-, and to say that he shall not vote at all because he is black or
white, is an entirely different thing. In the latter case, color is made the disqualifica-
tion, just as race would be if Germans were excluded from the ballot-box. The State
may preserve a right; it may fix the qualifications; it may impose certain restrictions so
as to have that right preserved in the best form to the people; but it is not legitimately
in the power of the State, it is not in any earthly power to destroy a man's equal lights
to his property, to his franchise, to his suffrage, or to the right to aspire to office-I
mean according to the true theory of republican government. That is the one thing,
that in this country, the Government cannot do.
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. app. 350 (1868). In this passage Yates was discussing politi-
cal rights, such as the right to vote and to hold office. See id. Although he did not consider
these rights to be privileges and immunities of citizenship, his distinction between the destruc-
tion of a right and its regulation is still instructive.
250. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1003 (1869).
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ered. And yet no man here thought of supposing that a privilege
of a citizen was denied, although it is confessedly by my friend
agreed to be a privilege, from the fact that the States regulate the
exercise of it.... [Elverybody knows that a right may be perfectly
secure and yet may be subject to regulation.251
Thus, congressional Republicans made a distinction between the le-
gitimate regulation of a fundamental right and its abridgement. Sec-
tion One was designed to prohibit the latter while refraining from in-
terfering with the former.
Although the states remained free to regulate the mode or manner
in which the privileges and immunities of the citizen might be exer-
cised, they were not free to abridge or destroy these rights-they
were inherent or inalienable rights of the citizen. According to Rep-
resentative William Lawrence of Ohio, matters involving contracting,
suing, and property rights were left to the states "subject only to the
limitation that there are some inherent and unalienable rights, per-
taining to every citizen, which cannot be abolished or abridged by
State constitutions or laws."
252
There were other constraints, however, placed upon the state's
power of regulation. Regulation of the fundamental rights of the
citizen had to be "equal." This guarantee of equal regulation was
said to be a principle of "republicanism." As Senator Lot M. Morill of
Maine stated:
The peculiar character, the genius of republicanism is equality, im-
partiality of rights and remedies among all citizens, not that the
citizen shall not be abridged in any of his natural rights. The man
yields that right to the nation when he becomes a citizen. The re-
publican guarantee is that all laws shall bear upon all alike in what
they enjoin and forbid, grant and enforce. This principle of equal-
ity before the law is as old as civilization, but it does not prevent the
State from qualif ing the rights of the citizen according to the pub-
lic necessities.
Thus, although as a general principle regulation of the privileges of
citizenship had to be equal, this equality directive could be super-
seded when the public necessity required.
This equality may have been one of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" of citizens. As Senator Wilson stated concerning the term
251. Id.
252. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1832 (1866). Representative Lawrence also stated
in response to concerns regarding invasion of the powers of the state governments, "I answer
that it is better to invade the judicial power of the State than permit it to invade, strike down,
and destroy the civil rights of citizens. Ajudicial power perverted to such uses should be speed-
ily invaded." Id. at 1837.
253. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1866).
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"immunities" in the Civil Rights Act, it "merely secure[d] to citizens
of the United States equality in the exemptions of the law."2 In par-
ticular, it was the function of the Civil Rights Act to enforce the privi-
lege or immunity of citizenship of being subject to equal regulation of
the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizenship. The lan-
guage of the Act guaranteed "the same" rights of citizenship. Repre-
sentative Shellabarger said with respect to this requirement that:
except so far as [the Civil Rights Bill] confers citizenship, it neither
confers nor defines nor regulates any right whatever. Its whole ef-
fect is not to confer or regulate rights, but to require that whatever
of these enumerated rights and obligations are imposed by State
laws shall be for and upon all citizens alike without distinctions
based on race or former condition of slaverysm
Similarly, Senator Trumbull argued that the Civil Rights Bill "will
have no operation in any state where.., all persons have the same
civil rights without regard to color or race."M Thus, the power to
regulate the rights of citizens was left in the hands of the state gov-
ernments under both the Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Representative Bingham acknowledged, Section
One of the Fourteenth Amendment took "from no State any right
that ever pertained to it.
"2
7
The distinction between fundamental privileges and immunities
and the regulations governing these privileges therefore explains the
contrast between the substantive language of Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the equality-based language of the Civil
Rights Act the Amendment was designed to constitutionalize.m The
language of the Amendment provided for a substantive guarantee of
fundamental privileges and immunities. Equality-based protection of
these fundamental privileges was derivative since each citizen was
guaranteed the same core set of fundamental rights. However, one
of the fundamental privileges guaranteed was the privilege of being
254. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Senator Trumbull added that the Act
"in no manner interfere[d] with the municipal regulations of any State which protects all alike
in their rights of person and property. It could have no operation in Massachusetts, NewYork,
Illinois, or most of the States of the Union." Id. at 1761.
255. Id. at 1293. Representative Shellabarger argued further that, "if this section did in fact
assume to confer or define or regulate these civil rights, which are named by the words con-
tract, sue, testify, inherit, &c., then it would.., be an assumption of the reserved rights of the
States and the people." Id.
256. Id. at 476, 1761 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (asserting that Section One would not
interfere with those States' municipal regulations that already provided equal protection).
257. Id. at 2542.
258. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 1387-88, 1391-96, 1424-33 (discussing the contrast be-
tween the equality-based language of the Civil Rights Act and the substantive language of the
Amendment).
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subject only to equal regulation. Thus, citizens received merely equal-
ity-based (anti-discrimination) protection with respect to the regula-
tions governing the fundamental privileges and immunities of citi-
zens. They did not receive a substantive guarantee that certain
regulations would or would not be put into place to govern the exer-
cise of citizens' fundamental privileges.
2. The Slaughter-Houses Cases
The principle of equality in regulation was recognized by both the
Miller majority and the dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases.2 For
example, Justice Bradley stated in his dissent that "[c]itizenship of
the United States ought to be, and, according to the Constitution, is,
a sure and undoubted title to equal rights in any and every State in
this Union, subject to such regulations as the legislature may right-
fully prescribe.,," According to Justice Miller, "[t] he power here ex-
ercised by the legislature of Louisiana is, in its essential nature, one
which has been, up to the present period in the constitutional history
of the country, always conceded to belong to the States, however it
may now be questioned in some of its details."2'
Justice Miller, quoting Chancellor Kent, articulated the test for
whether a regulation by a state pursuant to its police power violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of state legislation abridg-
ing the privileges and immunities of citizens:
"Unwholesome trades, slaughter-houses, operations offensive to the
senses, the deposit of powder, the application of steam power to
propel cars, the building with combustible materials, and the burial
of the dead, may all," says Chancellor Kent, "be interdicted by law,
in the midst of dense masses of population, on the general and ra-
tional principle, that every person ought so to use his property as
not to injure his neighbors; and that private interests must be made
subservient to the general interests of the community." This is
called the police power, and it is declared by Chief Justice Shaw
that it is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and
sources of it than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe limits to its
exercise.2 2
Justice Miller indicated that the regulation in question in Slaughter-
House was appropriate because exclusive privileges, such as the mo-
nopoly contemplated under the Louisiana statute, were not tradi-
259. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
260. Id. at 113 (BradleyJ., dissenting).
261. Id. at 62.
262. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tionally forbidden."
In contrast to Justice Miller, Justice Field found in his dissent that
the state of Louisiana had exceeded the limits of its police power in
passing the regulation because it had "infringed" upon a fundamen-
tal right of the people.2  Justice Bradley acknowledged that "[t]he
right of a State to regulate the conduct of its citizens is undoubtedly a
very broad and extensive one, and not to be lightly restricted."2  He
also stated, however, that "there are certain fundamental rights which
this right of regulation cannot infringe."2
Thus, the distinction between a permissible regulation of a funda-
mental privilege or immunity and its abridgement was carried over to
the congressional understanding of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of Section One, as well as the interpretation of the Clause by
the Slaughter-House dissenters. These regulations prescribing the
mode or manner in which the fundamental rights of citizens could
be exercised were municipal regulations.267 The sovereignty of the
states was to remain intact under the Amendment.m Later, Justice
263. Id. at 66 ("Nor can it be truthfully denied, that some of the most useful and beneficial
enterprises set on foot for the general good, have been made successful by means of these ex-
clusive rights, and could only have been conducted to success in that way.").
264. According to justice Field, the states limited in a legitimate way the fundamental privi-
leges and immunities of their citizens when they properly exercized their police power.
All sorts of restrictions and burdens are imposed under it [the police power), and
when these are not in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions, or fundamental
principles, they cannot be successfully assailed in ajudicial tribunal. With this power
of the State and its legitimate exercise I shall not differ from the majority of the court.
But under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation the State cannot be permit-
ted to encroach upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution in-
tended to secure against abridgment.
Id. at 87 (Field,j., dissenting).
265. Id. at 114 (BradleyJ., dissenting).
266. Id. (BradleyJ., dissenting). justice Bradley later commented on this power of regula-
tion in Missouri v. Lewis, where he stated that the Amendment"does not profess to secure to all
persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws or the same remedies. Great diversi-
ties in these respects may exist in two States separated by an imaginary line.... Each State pre-
scribes its own mode ofjudicia proceeding." 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879).
267. See id. at 59-61 (describing the content of regulations as being within the municipal
power).
268. Several statements by members of Congress indicate their concern that the sovereignty
of the state governments not be impaired by the new amendment. For example, Representa-
tive Roscoe Conkling, a member of the joint Committee on Reconstruction, argued that"the
proposition to prohibit States from denying civil or political rights to any class of persons, en-
counters a great objection on the threshold. It trenches upon the principle of existing local
sovereignty." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 358 (1866). Similarly, Representative Co-
lumbus Delano stated, "[Tihere are certain rights of citizenship that are exclusively within the
control of the States." Id. at app. 157. Finally, Representative Robert Hale declared that "all
powers having reference to the relationship of the individual to the municipal government, the
powers of local jurisdiction and legislation, are in general reserved to the states." Id. at 1063; see
also FLACK, supra note 12, at 68 ("Radical leaders were as aware as anyone of the attachment of a
great majority of the people to the doctrine of States Rights... the right of the States to regu-
late their own internal afir.... . "); Alfred H. Kelly, Comment on Harold Hyman's Paper, in NEW
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Bradley, one of the Slaughter-House dissenters, emphasized in the Civil
Rights Casesr that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did
not authorize Congress "to create a code of municipal law for the
regulation of private rights."270 This belief can be explained by not-
ing that the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens differ
from special privileges or municipal regulations. The latter were not
dictated under either the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, Section 2 or under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The distinction between a fundamental privilege or immunity of
the citizen and the regulation of the mode or manner in which the
privilege or immunity may be exercised can be traced to the distinc-
tion between the jus gentium and the civil law. The privileges and
immunities of citizenship were those common-law rights of the citi-
zen that were thought to exist anterior to the formation of govern-
ment, such as the right to hold property and to contract, whereas
civil rights were the expression of those common-law rights in the
positive law of the various states. By guaranteeing that no state could
abridge the "privileges or immunities of citizens," Section One of the
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect the fundamental
common-law rights of the citizenry, but did not extend to enshrine
any particular instantiation of these rights in the civil and criminal
codes of the various states. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment al-
lowed for great diversity in the way in which the state governments
chose to regulate the fundamental rights of the citizenry. It only pre-
vented the complete abridgement of these rights.
CONCLUSION
This Article has endeavored to explain certain beliefs of members
of Congress concerning the meaning of Section One of the Four-
teenth Amendment by analyzing the provisions of Article IV, which
served as precursors to Section One. The "privileges" and "immuni-
ties" guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2 were the same as those
later guaranteed under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These privileges and immunities were those capacities of the citizen
that existed anterior to the establishment of government, but which
could be regulated pursuant to the "common good" by the govern-
FRONTIERS OF AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 55 (Harold Hyman ed., 1966) (concluding that
.commitment to traditional state-federal relations meant" that"the radical Negro reform pro-
gram could be only a very limited one").
269. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
270. Id.at 21.
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ment that was subsequently established. These privileges and immu-
nities of citizens were those rights afforded citizens in all free gov-
ernments-governments that were characterized as "republican" in
form. They were the natural or fundamental rights that had been
borrowed from the English common law and which were embodied
in the positive law of the new nation. They were not thought to in-
clude political privileges and immunities, such as the right to vote or
to hold public office.
Although several commentators have argued that the privileges or
immunities of citizenship guaranteed under Section One that were
traditionally within the regulatory control of the state governments
(such as the ight to contract and to testify) are afforded merely anti-
discrimination (equality-based) protection under the Amendment,'
M
it is likely that they were originally intended to be provided substan-
tive protection as well. The privileges and immunities guaranteed
under the Amendment were those that were enjoyed by citizens in all
free governments. Thus, they would presumably exist and be guaran-
teed in all of the states. The states remained free to regulate the ex-
ercise of these fundamental capacities of citizenship in different ways
through municipal regulation. They did not, however, remain free
to abridge them. In this respect, Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not present any great change, since these principles
were already embodied in provisions of the original constitutional
text, as well as in the state constitutions and other organic law.
Understanding the nineteenth-century distinction bewteen the
regulation of a privilege (the law governing the mode or manner in
which a privilege could be exercised) and the underlying privilege
itself is the key to resolving the "riddle"2 concerning the nature of
the protection afforded under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
271. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 16, at 1410-33 (presenting the case for interpreting Sec-
tion One as only protecting against discrimination). William E. Nelson contends that"[b]y
understanding section one as an equality guarantee, the puzzle of how Congress could simul-
taneously have power to enforce the Bill of Rights and not have power to impose a specific pro-
vision of the Bill on a state is resolved." NELSON, supra note 152, at 119. Nelson notes that
many of the states ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment did not provide for all of the same Bill
of Rights protections in their state constitutions and yet did not oppose ratification or change
their constitutions to reflect the federal Bill of Rights after ratification. See id. at 117-18.
272. John Harrison has formulated the "riddle" of the text as follows:
Herein lies the riddle. The Equal Protection Clause seems to have the necessary focus
on equality, but its subject matter is limited to the protection of the laws, and it ex-
tends beyond citizens to all persons. The Privileges or Immunities Clause has the
right subject matter and the right coverage, because it is about citizens' rights, but it
appears to be a substantive limitation, not a ban on discrimination. Neither seems to
require equality with respect to the rights of citizenship set out in the Civil Rights Act.
How, then, did the Fourteenth Amendment constitutionalize the Act?
Harrison, supra note 16, at 1392.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. As the text makes plain, the privileges
or immunities of citizenship are guaranteed against "abridg[ment] ."
This is best read as a substantive guarantee of the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship. However, the text does not on its face ad-
dress the regulations governing these fundamental capacities of the
citizenry-the civil rights embodied in the municipal law of each
state.
The anti-discrimination (equality-based) reading of the Clause
picks up on the nineteenth-century understanding that one of the
privileges or immunities of citizenship was the guarantee that one
would be subject only to equal regulation of the mode or manner in
which fundamental privileges could be exercised. Thus, the privi-
leges of citizens were afforded substantive protection and anti-
discrimination (equality-based) protection derivatively. Meanwhile,
the regulation of these privileges or immunities received at best an
equality-based guarantee.2" This explains how the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act, which guaran-
teed citizens the "same rights" of citizenship. It also explains the pat-
ently substantive textual guarantee of "privileges" and "immunities"
and the seemingly inconsistent view repeated time and again by
members of Congress that the Fourteenth Amendment did not dic-
tate the civil or criminal codes of the states-it did not afford a sub-
stantive guarantee for the regulations governing the privileges or im-
munities of citizens. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment fully
preserved the federal system, while affording citizens a federal consti-
tutional guarantee of their most fundamental rights.
273. The guarantee of equality was not "absolute." Regulations that were unequal in some
sense but were necessarily so because they were in the interest of the public good did not
"abridge" citizens' fundamental privileges and immunities. Moreover, nineteenth-century legal
scholars recognized a variety of forms of natural inequalities that pre-existed the state. The
state's recognition of these natural inequalities was not thought to constitute an
"abridge [ment]" of citizens fundamental privileges and immunities.

